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I. INTRODUCTION
People who sign standard form contracts' rarely read them.2 Coun-
sel for one party (or one industry) generally prepare standard form con-
tracts for repetitive use in consecutive transactions.3 The party who has
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1. Friedrich Kessler, in a pioneering work on contracts of adhesion, described the origins of
standard form contracts: "The development of large scale enterprise with its mass production and
mass distribution made a new type of contract inevitable-the standardized mass contract. A stan-
dardized contract, once its contents have been formulated by a business firm, is used in every bar-
gain dealing with the same product or service .... " Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 631-32 (1943).
2. Professor Woodward offers an excellent explanation:
Real assent to any given term in a form contract, including a merger clause, depends on
how "rational" it is for the non-drafter (consumer and non-consumer alike) to attempt to
understand what is in the form. This, in turn, is primarily a function of two observable
facts: (1) the complexity and obscurity of the term in question and (2) the size of the un-
derlying transaction. The vendee's perception of the effort to be expended in securing al-
ternatives to the terms in the form is also important in a recipient's decisions (1) whether
to read the form in the first instance and (2) whether to seek alternatives either through
negotiation with the vendor or through a search for alternative vendors. The commonly
held idea that a business vendee that accepts the goods has assented to the entire form be-
cause she could have foregone the purchase (and, by making the purchase, took the risk
of whatever happened to be in the form) does not hold up analytically. A single transac-
tion can carry only a given investment in understanding it, however sophisticated,
wealthy, or powerful the non-drafter. The more complex or obscure the term, the greater
the effort (in the form of reading, puzzling, or legal research) required to understand it;
the smaller the transaction, the less such effort the contract can support.
William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 971, 989
(2001).
3. Kessler, supra note 1, at 632.
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the greater bargaining power usually writes the standard form contract
and often presents it for signature on a "take it or leave it" basis. 4 Both
contracting parties usually perform and are satisfied by standard form
contracts in the vast majority of transactions. 5 Performance in some con-
tracts may break down, but the parties are able to come to an amicable
resolution of the problem.6 Other broken deals go to arbitration, leaving
no precedent behind because the results are unreported. Still other cases
are litigated and either settle or go to judgment; in either event, those
results are also unreported.8 After all of these cases are subtracted, only
the reported cases remain. In the reported cases, litigation usually begins
after a problem with contract performance arises and one party sues to
compel the other to abide by one or more of the contract terms. At this
point, the defendant may deny that the term is part of the parties' agree-
ment. Alternatively, the defendant may argue that even if the term is part
of the agreement, the court should not enforce it.
Scholars have suggested a variety of approaches to analyzing the
enforceability of terms in standard form contracts since people first
began to use them. 9 These approaches either accept or reject the tradi-
tional approach to analyzing all contracts, which relies largely on the
4. See discussion infra Part III.A. When the buyer is sophisticated enough to have its own
standard forms, the result is usually a bargaining situation in which the parties' bargaining power is
more equal. Of course, it is also possible to have a large powerful buyer, such as a company like the
Boeing Corporation or Microsoft, impose its will in contract situations with small "mom and pop"
vendors. Although not all standard form contracts are contracts of adhesion, for convenience, this
Article refers to the party with the standard form as the "form drafter," and the party who signs the
form as the "adhering party."
5. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4 (1983) (assembling and analyzing data to demonstrate that only a small portion of troubles
and injuries become disputes; only a small portion of these become lawsuits, and of those that do,
the vast majority are abandoned, settled, or routinely processed without full-blown adjudication).
6. See generally Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How
Standard Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104
MICH. L. REV. 857 (2006) (providing comprehensive discussion over dispute resolution with regards
to standard form contracts).
7. See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 780-85 (2001) (discussing the problems for contract doctrine of losing con-
tract cases to arbitration).
8. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-
Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 442-45 (1992) (discussing cases
ending before reaching ajudgment in litigation).
9. Professor Meyerson traced the first use of standard form contracts to use in connection with
marine insurance in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification




objective theory of assent and a corresponding "duty to read."' 0 The tra-
ditional approach usually leads to enforcement of the disputed terms."
Many contract scholars rationalize and support the enforceability of
standard form contracts.1 2 Others attack the enforceability of standard
form contracts.'
3
Much scholarship questioning the enforcement of standard form
contract terms offers interesting insights into possible approaches a court
can take in analyzing the issue, but the literature largely fails to examine
what courts actually do in these cases. 14 This Article identifies the gap
between what scholars are saying about standard form contracts and what
courts are doing about them. It notes that courts have not accepted the
scholarship that urges a nontraditional approach to analyzing assent.
15
Rather-with but a few exceptions-what has emerged is a case-by-case
unconscionability analysis in which courts focus narrowly on particular
terms and conditions in standard form contract cases, and refuse to en-
force only a limited number of provisions in a limited number of cases.16
Most courts continue to assert that mutual assent is necessary for
contract formation. 17 These courts require some outward manifestation
of assent, usually a form of oral or written communication.1 8 Courts al-
most always find the requisite outward manifestation of assent based on
the act of signing a standard form contract. 19 In cases in which the con-
tracting parties have unequal bargaining power, courts refuse to enforce
standard form contract terms only when the court concludes that both
substantive and procedural unconscionability were present when the
10. See discussion infra Part II.A.
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.
12. See discussion infra Part IIA-B.
13. See discussion infra Part III.C-E.
14. See discussion infra Part III.C-E.
15. A recent study concludes that courts generally ignore contracts scholarship. Gregory Scott
Crespi, The Influence of Two Decades of Contract Law Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empiri-
cal Analysis, 57 SMU L. REV. 105, 107-18 (2004). See also Adam Liptak, When Rendering Deci-
sions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at A8.
16. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
17. See Schaer v. Webster County, 644 N.W.2d 327, 338 (Iowa 2002) (citing Heartland Ex-
press, Inc. v. Terry, 631 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Iowa 2001)) ("For a contract to be valid, the parties must
express mutual assent to the terms of the contract."); Magnusson Agency v. Pub. Entity Nat'l Co.-
Midwest, 560 N.W.2d 20, 26 (Iowa 1997); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 37 (1999); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.1 (4th ed. 2004).
18. "Mutual assent is based on objective evidence, not the hidden intent of the parties."
Schaer, 644 N.W.2d at 338; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 3.6.
19. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 36 (1960).
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parties signed the contract.2° Most contracts between parties with rela-
tively equal bargaining power are enforced.21
Courts seem to enforce most terms in standard form contracts be-
cause of judges' underlying belief in the importance of such contracts in
commerce. Scholars who support a unitary theory of contract analysis
22
bolster the judicial inclination to enforce such terms.23 If courts analyze
standard form contracts in the same way that they analyze contracts ne-
gotiated by parties with equal bargaining power, then courts will con-
tinue to find the requisite assent, and unconscionability or other broadly-
stated "public policy" concerns will continue to be the only basis for ex-
cluding challenged terms.
This Article suggests that an unconscionability analysis is an unsat-
isfactory approach for courts to follow when they determine whether to
enforce standard form contract terms. The unconscionability approach
requires individual contracting parties to raise the defense and prevail in
litigation. However, parties who lack bargaining power will generally
also lack the knowledge that they have a legal challenge to the enforce-
ment of terms, and the financial means to litigate. Furthermore, an un-
conscionability approach requires the challenging party to meet the ex-
tremely high burden of showing a serious defect in the bargaining proc-
ess, in the substance of the challenged term, or in both.24 Most plaintiffs
will have a hard time making the necessary showing.
Courts should adopt an assent-based analysis for determining
whether to enforce disputed standard form contract terms because such
an analysis is superior to an unconscionability analysis. As many schol-
ars and some courts have recognized, it is a fiction to characterize what
occurs in the formation stage of a standard form contract as a party's as-
sent to all contract terms.25  Rather than continuing to perpetuate that
fiction, courts should separately analyze a party's assent to particular
unbargained-for contract terms in standard form contracts and that
party's assent to undertaking a contractual obligation.
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. Jane A. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 SMU L. REV. 1065
(1986).
22. By "a unitary theory," I refer to a theory that attempts to explain and encompass all issues
that may arise in connection with contracts, whether they are standard form contracts used between a
retail store and its consumer customer or complex carefully negotiated contracts reached between
two multi-national corporations after substantial bargaining.
23. See discussion infra Part III.D.
24. See discussion infra Part lI.B.
25. One of the first scholars to articulate this distinction was Karl Llewellyn. See LLEWELLYN,
supra note 19, at 370.
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Courts should determine the enforceability of certain unbargained-
for terms based on a concept I call "knowing assent.' '26 Knowing assent
means more than signing on the dotted line. Knowing assent requires the
following: (1) that the unbargained-for term be conspicuous; 27 (2) that
the importance of that term be explained so that the adhering party un-
derstands its significance; and (3) that the adhering party objectively
manifests its assent to that term separately from its manifestation of as-
sent to undertaking a contractual obligation.28 Courts would impose the
knowing assent requirement on contract provisions that unduly favor the
form drafter or deprive the adhering party of a right or remedy that
would otherwise be available to the adhering party in the absence of such
a contract term or clause. 29  The knowing assent analysis is preferable
because it would recognize the reality of the situation leading to the for-
mation of a standard form contract.3° An assent-based analysis would
shift the burden from the adhering party to the form drafter by requiring
the drafter to show that the adhering party knew the terms in the contract
and knowingly agreed to those terms. Unlike unconscionability, a know-
ing assent analysis would not require a showing of extreme unfairness
31before a court could refuse to enforce a particular contract term.
The seven parts of this Article reflect why an assent-based analysis
is preferable to an unconscionability analysis. Part 11 describes the outer
26. A reference to "knowing assent" or "knowing consent" is certainly not new. See Windsor
Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (court referred
to the principle of "knowing consent" to contract terms); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Prin-
ciple and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 752-54 (1982) ("much of the scholarly literature and
case law concerning unconscionability has emphasized the element of unfair surprise, in which a
major underpinning of the bargain principle-knowing assent-is absent by hypothesis") (emphasis
added).
27. The Uniform Commercial Code states that a term or clause is "conspicuous" when it is so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. U.C.C. § 1-
201(10) (1977).
28. The Uniform Commercial Code has used the analogous concept of "separate signing" in
connection with the making of a firm offer. Under section 2-205, if the offeror uses a form provided
by the offeree, the "term of assurance" that makes the offer irrevocable must be "separately signed"
by the offeree. Official Comment 4 explains that "protection is afforded against the inadvertent
signing of a firm offer when contained in a form prepared by the offeree by requiring that such a
clause be separately authenticated. If the offer clause is called to the offeror's attention and he sepa-
rately authenticates it, he will be bound ...." U.C.C. § 2-205 cmt. 4 (2003).
29. Such terms include, among others, exculpatory provisions, one-sided arbitration provisions,
and remedy limitations. See discussion infra Part V, noting some of these types of terms.
30. That reality is that the adhering party does not bargain over terms in standard form con-
tracts. See Woodward, supra note 2, at 973 (observing, "the 'real world' of sales tends to be domi-
nated by form contracts, rather than contracts that are actually negotiated."); Donald B. King, Stan-
dard Form Contracts: A Call for Reality, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 909 (2000).
31. For a discussion of the requisite showing for a finding of unconscionability, see discussion
infra Part lI.B.
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limits of courts' enforcement of standard form contract terms under tradi-
tional contract assent and unconscionability analyses. Part III reviews
the scholarly literature that introduces and explains the variety of theories
regarding enforceability of standard form contract terms. As will be
shown, almost every scholarly theory supports enforcement of most
standard form contract terms, leaving unconscionability as the main
ground for attacking the enforceability of particular terms. Part IV de-
scribes some legislative and quasi-legislative attempts to formulate new
approaches courts could take in analyzing the enforceability of standard
form contract terms. Part IV reveals that legislatures have rarely inter-
vened in this area of law by enacting new laws and that the battle over
enforcement of standard form contract terms likely will continue to wage
in the courts. Nevertheless, some of the proposed legislation offers a
possible model of a knowing assent analysis that courts could follow.
Part V addresses the problems with standard form contracts, and
discusses what the courts are doing about them. Specifically, Part V dis-
cusses selected standard form contract terms that parties repeatedly liti-
gate. It includes a discussion of illustrative cases that demonstrate that
courts rarely strike terms based on unconscionability and that support the
need for a knowing assent analysis. Part VI looks at the relatively few
instances where courts have used an assent-based analysis to excise stan-
dard form contract terms. Part VI demonstrates how other courts can,
and when they should, adopt a knowing assent analysis. Finally, Part VII
makes the case for a knowing assent analysis.
II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF STANDARD FORM CONTRACT TERMS UNDER
TRADITIONAL CONTRACT ASSENT AND UNCONSCIONABILITY ANALYSES
Traditional judicial analysis of standard form contract term en-
forceability is based primarily on two important concepts: assent and
unconscionability. 32 An understanding of the deeply entrenched doctrine
in these two areas is key to understanding the special challenges raised in
the context of standard form contracts and the need for a knowing assent
analysis.
32. With apologies to John J.A. Burke, I use the phrase "traditional judicial analysis" or "tradi-
tional contract law" to refer to the doctrine commonly used by courts to analyze contract disputes, as
represented in large part in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. In relevant part, Burke provides,
"[i]n 1931, Karl Llewellyn clarified that there is no monolithic system of 'traditional contract law..
. However, the truth of that statement has neither stopped nor even slowed down scholars from
using the term 'traditional contract law' as shorthand for the standard rules taught in law school
about contracts." John J.A. Burke, Reinventing Contract, 10 MURDOCH U. ELEC. J.L. 2, n.28





A contract may be loosely defined as a voluntary agreement that the
law will enforce.33 The parties' assent to be contractually bound must be
manifested objectively; their subjective intent is irrelevant. 34 Traditional
contract assent analysis is based on the paradigm of two parties with rela-
tively equal bargaining power who, through a bargaining process, "carve
out" particular contract terms to serve their respective self-interests.35
Mutual assent to a contract is generally found in the process of offer
and acceptance. 36 Both offer and acceptance are defined in terms of an
outward manifestation of intent to be bound.37  Before a party's commu-
nication constitutes an offer, most of the proposed contract terms must be
incorporated into that communication. 38 If a communication lacks suffi-
cient detail, a court will conclude that the "offeror" is merely in the proc-
ess of negotiating and has not yet reached a stage of specificity that war-
rants classifying the communication as an offer.39 Under the traditional
analysis, enforceable contracts require a great deal of specificity. 40 Even
after an offeror communicates an offer to the offeree, the offeree's accep-
tance must "mirror" the offer before a court will find mutual assent to the
bargain.4 '
33. The Restatement provides, "the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is
a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange .... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
17(1) (1981).
34. Meyerson, supra note 9, at 1266-67.
35. Robert Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 454 (2002) ("Courts recognize that standard-form transactions do not in-
volve the required 'bargain' of classical contract law."). See also Edward A Dauer, Contracts of
Adhesion in Light of the Bargain Hypothesis: An Introduction, 5 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1972). For an
in-depth discussion of classical contract assumptions, see Andrew Burgess, Consumer Adhesion
Contracts and Unfair Terms: A Critique of Current Theory and a Suggestion, 15 ANGLO-AM. L.
REV. 255 (1986).
36. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 3.3.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 24, 50 (1981).
38. This is commonly referred to as a requirement of "definiteness." See, e.g., FARNSWORTH,
supra note 17, § 3.10 (discussing what constitutes an offer); §§ 3.27-3.30 (explaining that the re-
quirement of definiteness is implicit in the premise that contract law protects the promisee's expecta-
tion interest because a court must determine the scope of that promise with some precision).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981).
40. Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1641, 1641 n.l (2003) (citing Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541,
543 (N.Y. 1981)); Varney v. Ditmars, 11l N.E. 822, 824 (N.Y. 1916); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 33 (1981); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 32 (1932); 1 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 37-49 (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed.
1957).
41. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 3.13; John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement
Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 745 (1982). This
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As a corollary to finding assent to contract formation, traditional
contract doctrine imposes on the parties a "duty to read.' ' 2 Accordingly,
if a party objectively manifests assent to be bound to a contract (for ex-
ample, by signing a written contract document), a court will almost
automatically find assent to all terms contained in the writing.43 Courts
meet parties' excuses such as, "I didn't read it" or "I didn't understand
it" with little sympathy, except in cases where more important policies
are expressed in the traditional contract defenses. 44
Once the parties have manifested assent to a bargain by entering
into a written standard form contract, their performance obligations are
defined by the terms of that contract. Accordingly, when disputes arise
with respect to performance, the court's starting point for determining
liability for non-performance is to analyze the terms of the contract.45
Any discussion of contract terms generally is either a question of integra-
tion4 6 or interpretation.47
When a court analyzes integration-whether a particular term that
is not contained in the written contract is part of the parties' agreement-
it must determine whether the parties intended the written contract to
embody their entire agreement. However, when a court finds intent
based on a signature on a standard form contract, the court ignores the
likelihood that the adhering party thought promises made before she
signed the writing remained part of the agreement.
48
rule is not reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which reflects the UCC's approach to
acceptances that vary the terms of the offer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 61 (1981).
42. See John D. Calamari, Duty to Read: A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341
(1974) (discussing the traditional contract rule that parties have a duty to read contracts).
43. Id.
44. Id. Justice Holmes explained the objective theory of contracts succinctly: "[T]he making
of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of
two sets of external signs-not on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said
the same thing." O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897); see also
Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875) ("It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and,
when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did
not know what it contained. If this were permitted, contracts would [be worthless.]").
45. If a party raises an enforceability issue, it is usually raised before performance has begun in
the context of defending against enforcement of the entire contract based on traditional contract
defenses.
46. For example, is the entire agreement of the parties embodied in the writing, or did they
agree to something else not reflected in the writing?
47. For example, what did the parties intend by the words they used (what do the words in the
contract mean?)?
48. An exception is made in the case of fraud. Some courts, and the Restatement (Second), take
the position that if a party misrepresents the terms of a writing and the other party relies on the mis-
representation and signs the document without reading it, the adhering party is not bound by the
[Vol. 31:469
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A court's discussion of integration is usually part of a parol evi-
dence rule analysis. 49  Historically, the parol evidence rule operated to
exclude evidence extrinsic to an integrated writing. It is more than a rule
of evidence because, by operating to exclude or admit evidence, it oper-
ates to include or exclude contract terms that do not appear in a written
contract document. 50
A common understanding under the parol evidence rule is that a
court will exclude evidence of prior or contemporaneous extrinsic
agreements if the parties enter into a completely integrated written
agreement. 51 However, different jurisdictions follow different rules for
determining whether an agreement is "completely integrated," so as to
exclude all evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements not em-
bodied in the writing. Attorneys who draft standard form contracts gen-
erally include a provision, commonly referred to as an "integration" or
"merger" clause, which is intended to support an interpretation of the
writing as completely integrated.52 These clauses are often contained in
the "boilerplate, 53 at the end of the document. "A merger clause
terms of the writing. Calamari, supra note 42, at 345; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 21
(1981).
49. The parol evidence rule evolved based on the assumption that when parties adopt a written
document as the embodiment of their contract, it is reasonable to assume that they have incorporated
all of the terms of their agreement in the writing. Accordingly, the parol evidence rule was initially
developed to exclude evidence of agreements extrinsic to (outside of) the writing. Because contract
law seeks to enforce the voluntary agreements of the parties, an important element of any parol
evidence rule analysis is determining whether the parties intended the written document to be the
full, final, complete, and exclusive expression of their agreement. This determination is often
framed in terms of whether the writing is partially or completely "integrated."
50. Peter Linzer, Symposium: A Tribute to Professor Joseph M Perillo: The Comfort of Cer-
tainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 802 (2002); Scott J.
Burnham, The Parol Evidence Rule: Don't Be Afraid of the Dark, 55 MONT. L. REV. 93, 96 (1994).
An exhaustive discussion of the parol evidence rule is beyond the scope of this article. Some excel-
lent discussions include the following sources: Richard F. Broude, The Consumer and the Parol
Evidence Rule: Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1970 DUKE L.J. 881 (1970); James
Mooney, A Friendly Letter to the Oregon Supreme Court: Let's Try Again on the Parol Evidence
Rule, 84 OR. L. REV. 369 (2005); Justin Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis
and Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1049-51 (1968); Burnham, supra note 50;
and John E. Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 337 (1965).
51. Burnham, supra note 50, at 97.
52. See discussion infra Part V.D.
53. Boilerplate has been described as "the building blocks of standard-form, nonnegotiated
contracts." Omri Ben-Shahar, "Boilerplate": Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium Fore-
word, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821, 821 (2006). The word "boilerplate" has two senses, one wider and
one narrower. The broad "boilerplate" refers to any standardized term in a contract. But the word
can also be used to refer to provisions that typically are found at the end of a contract and deal with
recurring matters like assignment and delegation, successors and assigns, third-party beneficiaries,
governing law and forum selection, waiver of jury trial, arbitration, remedies, indemnities, force
majeure, transaction costs, confidentiality, announcements and notices, amendment and waiver,
2008]
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provides that the written contract constitutes the entire agreement be-
tween the parties and that any prior or contemporaneous agreements are
not considered part of the parties' agreement., 54 When a merger clause
is a term in a standard form contract, it may operate to exclude evidence
of oral representations and prior agreements. As a result, an unsophisti-
cated buyer of goods may enter into a contract relying on promises and
representations made by the seller. When a dispute arises later, and the
buyer bases a claim on those promises and representations, the buyer
may find that a court will not enforce them because of a merger clause in
the contract of which the buyer was unaware.
After a court determines which agreements are included in the par-
ties' contract, the court must fully understand the parties' obligations by
interpreting the meaning of particular contract terms. 55  The court re-
solves interpretation issues by using an objective standard.5 6 Thus, if ju-
dicial enforcement of a contract becomes necessary, the court determines
what meaning a reasonable person would impute to the parties' objective
manifestations of agreement.
57
severability, merger, and captions. Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate in Con-
tracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1191 (2006) (citing TINA L.
STARK, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING CONTRACT BOILERPLATE, vii-xxii, 5 (ALM Publishing
2003)).
54. Sample merger clauses include the following:
1. Entire Agreement - This Agreement, including the documents and the instruments re-
ferred to herein, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties relating to its subject
matter and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous negotiations or agreements, whether
oral or written, relating to the subject matter hereof. Any amendment or change in this
Agreement shall not be valid unless made in writing and signed by both parties.
2. Entire Agreement - This Agreement contains the entire Agreement of the parties
hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and may not be amended except by a
written instrument duly executed and delivered by each party.
3. Entire Agreement - This Agreement, and the documents or instruments referred to
herein, embodies the entire agreement and the understanding of the parties hereto in re-
spect of the subject matter contained herein. The parties have not relied upon any prom-
ises, representations, warranties, agreements, covenants, or undertakings, other than those
expressly set forth or referred to herein. This Agreement supersedes all prior agreements
and the understanding between the parties with respect to such subject matter.
Brad S. Karp, The Litigation Angle in Drafting Commercial Contracts, 1219 PRACTICING L. INST.
CORP. L. & PRACT. 487, 519 (2000).
55. For a famous discussion of the process of interpretation and construction of contract terms,
see Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833
(1964).
56. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:4 (4th ed.
1999).
57. Id. There are some exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 20, 201-04 (1981) (stating rules regarding effect of misunderstanding on manifesta-
tion of assent) and §§ 201-04 (stating rules of interpretation).
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If the court applies the traditional analysis described above, it does
not distinguish between assent to contract formation and assent to par-
ticular contract terms.58 Since the finding of assent to contract formation
is coupled with the so-called duty to read, it follows that a party is bound
to all terms of a standard form contract if he or she outwardly manifests
assent, whether or not the party read or understood the terms.5 9
In the twentieth century, some scholars began to attack the applica-
tion of traditional contract analysis, which is based on the model of two
parties with equal bargaining power, in cases involving standard form
contracts. 60 They recognized that many standard form contract terms are
not negotiated, other than deal-specific terms such as price, quantity, de-
livery dates, and similar terms and that the two parties frequently do not
have equal bargaining power.6' Scholars realized that imposing a duty to
read makes little sense when there is no possibility of negotiating a
change in terms.62 Because standard form contract transactions do not
resemble the traditional paradigm of a negotiated contract, such scholars
believe that the traditional analysis of mutual assent is no longer appro-
priate. 63 Indeed, there appears to be a general consensus among scholars
that a court should not treat the mere act of signing a standard form con-
tract as assent to all of the individual terms of the contract.64 The inquiry
58. See discussion supra Part I1.
59. But see Meyerson, supra note 9, at 1268, (arguing that such a conclusion is not necessarily
dictated by an objective analysis).
60. Many of the commentators limited the scope of their discussions to standard form contracts
in consumer transactions. However, as I have discussed elsewhere, I believe that most of the prob-
lems associated with standard form contracts relate to the inequality of bargaining power between
the parties, a problem that is found in many transactions involving small businesses and other non-
consumers. See generally Edith R. Warkentine, Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect
Consumers and "Merchant/Consumers" Through Default Provisions, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 39
(1996). Accordingly, I do not distinguish in this Article between standard form contract transactions
depending on whether the adhering party is a consumer. Although many courts and commentators
emphasize that distinction, the same fiction of assent permeates all transactions involving standard
form contracts whether the adhering party is a consumer or not. A small business that signs a stan-
dard form contract without an opportunity to negotiate its contents has no more power to change the
contract terms than a similarly situated consumer. Therefore, there is no reason to treat differently
form drafters whose standard form contracts are used in business transactions as opposed to those
whose standard forms are used exclusively in consumer transactions. The traditional rules of con-
tract law make sense and should continue to apply only to transactions that meet the traditional para-
digm of a bargained-for agreement between parties with relatively equal bargaining power. Other-
wise, a "knowing assent" standard should be used to evaluate the enforceability of suspect terms in
standard form contracts.
61. See discussion of different scholarly approaches infra Part Ill.
62. See discussion of different scholarly approaches infra Part Ill
63. See discussion of different scholarly approaches infra Part III.
64. See discussion infra Part Ill.J.
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therefore, shifts to a question of which terms will be deemed part of the
contract and which terms will not.65
B. Unconscionability
The second legal concept that courts commonly use in analyzing
whether to enforce standard form contract terms is unconscionability.
Like the doctrine of assent, the doctrine of unconscionability focuses on
the formation stage of the contract.66 Unlike an assent analysis, however,
an unconscionability analysis does not examine whether the parties
agreed to the disputed terms.
67
An unconscionability analysis focuses on (1) the bargaining process
leading to purported agreement to the terms (sometimes referred to as
"procedural unconscionability"), and (2) the substantive "fairness" of the
disputed terms ("substantive unconscionability"). 68 If a court deems a
term unconscionable, the term will be stricken from the contract.69
The unconscionability defense developed in the equity courts,
where chancellors used the analysis to police bargains which appeared to
be unfair, but which resisted attack under traditional contract defenses.7 °
Although the defense long predates legislative enactment, its use became
increasingly widespread after its incorporation into Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code 71 (UCC) and the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts.72 Most jurisdictions have applied the doctrine not only to transac-
tions governed by Article 2, but also to contracts outside its purview.
73
65. For the different answers scholars have given to this question, see discussion infra Part III.
66. U.C.C. § 2-302 begins, "[i]f the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made .... U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003) (em-
phasis added).
67. See discussion infra Part II.B. It is interesting to note that in early drafts of section 2-302,
an attempt was made to frame the concept in terms of assent. For a detailed discussion of the draft-
ing history of section 2-302, see Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Em-
peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
68. This distinction is not necessarily apparent from the statutory language, but was highlighted
by Arthur Leff. Leff, supra note 67.
69. Section 2-302 further provides, "the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the appli-
cation of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result." U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003).
70. See Martin B. Shulkin, Unconscionability-The Code, the Court and the Consumer, 9 B.C.
INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 367 (1968) (reviewing early cases decided under U.C.C. § 2-302).
71. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003).
72. Section 208 reads as follows:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to
avoid any unconscionable result.
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The most common approach to an unconscionability analysis fol-
lows the framework first outlined by Arthur Leff in his seminal article
that critiqued UCC 2-302 for its failure to include a definition of the
term.74 However, although section 2-302 is itself silent on how to deter-
mine unconscionability, the Official Comments give some guidance.7 5
Specifically, it can be inferred from the Official Comments that the basic
test of unconscionability is
whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses in-
volved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circum-
stances existing at the time of the making of the contract .... The
principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise.
. and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power.
76
The Official Comments reflect Leff s proposed analytic frame-
work.77 He advanced a two-prong analysis where a court will not enforce
the term if it finds both procedural and substantive unconscionability.
78
Procedural unconscionability typically rests on defects in the bargaining
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). For more in-depth discussions of uncon-
scionability, see M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Robert
A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for UCC Section
2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1981); Leff, supra note 67; Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and
the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1970); John E.
Murray Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969); John A. Spanogle
Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969); Richard E. Speidel,
Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1970).
73. In some states, such as California, unconscionability has been made applicable to all con-
tracts by statute. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (2006). Courts in many other states continue to apply
the doctrine to non-sales contracts as a matter of common law. See Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d
379 (Alaska 1986) (applying unconscionability, as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
208, to a contract to purchase an apartment house); Hamm v. Taylor, 429 A.2d 946, 948 (Conn.
1980) (permitting a challenge to a mortgage note on grounds of unconscionability, citing UCC § 2-
302 as a "useful guide"). Comment A to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 provides
the following:
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302 is literally inapplicable to contracts not involving the
sale of goods, but it has proven very influential in non-sales cases. It has many times been
used either by analogy or because it was felt to embody a generally accepted social atti-
tude of fairness going beyond its statutory application to sales of goods.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 Reporter's Note cmt. a (1981) (citations omitted).
74. Leff, supra note 67.
75. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003).
76. Id.
77. See Leff, supra note 67 (noting that the comment's reference to the "prevention of oppres-
sion" is recognized now as referring to 'procedural' unconscionability; the reference to preventing
unfair surprise' is tied to the concept of 'substantive' unconscionability).
78. Id.
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process, such as clauses that are "buried" in fine print,7 9 or lack of nego-
tiations over terms. On the other hand, terms are substantively uncon-
scionable when they are "harsh, "8  or "one-sided., 82  Although most
courts follow Leff' s view that elements of both procedural and substan-
tive unconscionability must be present before a term is unenforceable,
many have adopted the viewpoint that a "sliding scale" is appropriate;
that is, the more egregious the procedural unconscionability, the less sub-
stantive unconscionability need be present, and vice versa.83 In a minor-
ity of jurisdictions, terms may be excised upon proof of either procedural
or substantive unconscionability; both are not required.84
79. See Colonial Leasing Co. v. Best, 552 F. Supp. 605 (D. Or. 1982); Oldham's Farm Sausage
Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
80. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (stat-
ing that there was "little dispute" that an arbitration agreement was adhesive because "[i]t was im-
posed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate").
Analysis of procedural unconscionability focuses on "oppression" or "surprise." Flores v. Trans-
america HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 852-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). "Oppression arises
from an inequality of bargaining power that results in no real negotiation and an absence of mean-
ingful choice," while "[s]urprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms are
hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them." Id. (citing A & M
Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121-22 (1982)); Alexander v. Anthony Int'l,
L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that an agreement to arbitrate is procedurally uncon-
scionable, and therefore unenforceable, because there was no opportunity to negotiate).
81. See, e.g., AI-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 2005) (provi-
sions in arbitration agreement (1) forcing employees to arbitrate claims against Circuit City, but not
requiring Circuit City to arbitrate claims against employees, (2) limiting remedies, (3) splitting costs
and fees, (4) imposing a one-year statute of limitations, (5) prohibiting class actions, (6) regarding
the filing fee and waiver of the fee, and (7) giving Circuit City the unilateral right to terminate or
modify the agreement were all substantively unconscionable under Washington law).
82. See State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 280 (W. Va. 2002) (indicating one-
sided preservation of the right of access to the courts is unconscionable); Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct,
977 P.2d 989 (Mont. 1999) (arbitration provision contained in a contract for advertisement in a tele-
phone directory unconscionably one-sided).
83. See Spanogle, supra note 72, at 950.
84. The most common instance is where courts have found unconscionability based on exces-
sive price (substantively unconscionable) alone. See American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Ma-
Over, 201 A.2d 886, 888 (N.H. 1964) (holding that contract violated state disclosure statute, but
refused to enforce contract on grounds of unconscionability where homeowners would have to pay
$2,568.60 (inclusive of commission, interest and carrying charges) for home improvements valued at
$959.00); Gilman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. 1988) ("[W]hile
determinations of unconscionability are ordinarily based on the court's conclusion that both proce-
dural and substantive components are present ... there have been exceptional cases where a provi-
sion of the contract is so outrageous as to warrant holding it unenforceable on the grounds of sub-
stantive unconscionability alone."). Both the Arizona and Washington Supreme Courts have held
that a showing of substantive unconscionability alone is sufficient, but reserved a holding on
whether procedural unconscionability alone can render a contract unconscionable. See Maxwell v.
Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995) (contract could be unconscionable because of
grossly-excessive price and security terms permitting lender not only to repossess water heater that it
financed, but also to foreclose on borrower's home); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 781
2008] Beyond Unconscionability
Immediately after states began adopting Article 2, parties rarely
raised unconscionability defenses, and those who did had little success.
85
Gradually, however, the number of reported cases involving an uncon-
scionability defense swelled. 86 These cases usually involve the enforce-
ability of particular standard form contract terms.87  If a court deems a
clause unconscionable, the court will not enforce it. 88  Sometimes the
behavior complained of is so severe that a court will refuse to enforce the
entire contract. 89 What most of the successful cases tend to have in com-
mon is a consumer defendant who signed a standard form contract. 90
Cases involving sophisticated business people who have successfully
asserted an unconscionability argument are almost nonexistent.91 How-
ever, courts have been willing to rule in favor of non-consumers who
raise the defense that they lack business sophistication and legal repre-
sentation, because they more closely resemble a consumer than a busi-
ness person.92
(Wash. 2004) (considering the enforceability of a pre-dispute employment arbitration agreement in
the context of employment discrimination litigation). One court appears to have decided a case
based on procedural unconscionability alone, but in that case the trial court had also found the chal-
lenged arbitration clause to be substantively unconscionable; the appellate court did not address the
substantive unconscionability question once it found procedural unconscionability. E. Ford, Inc. v.
Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 2002). The majority ofjurisdictions continue to require a showing of
both procedural and substantive unconscionability. It makes sense that both elements are required.
If the bargaining process is somehow flawed, but the result is a term that is not unfair, why strike the
term? Similarly, if the bargaining process is proper, which would insure that the bargaining parties
had a reason for agreeing to the term, why "second guess" the parties' own negotiated risk allocation
by striking the term? Note that an assent analysis would more directly address the unspoken prob-
lem that unconscionability skirts by its emphasis on whether the parties understood and agreed to the
term rather than by trying to substitute the court's judgment as to the desirability of the term.
85. See Shulkin, supra note 70 (stating that although Pennsylvania became the first state to
adopt the UCC in 1954, it was not until 1964 that section 2-302 was even cited as an alternate hold-
ing in the case of American Home Improvement Co. v. Maclver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964)).
86. See, e.g., Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004) (discussing the swelling number of cases attacking
arbitration provisions on unconscionability grounds).
87. See discussion infra Part V (survey of "typical" types of contract clauses that are attacked
on unconscionability grounds).
88. See, e.g., Zuver v. Airtouch Commc'ns, 103 P.3d 753 (Wash. 2004) (relying on severability
clause in contract to strike substantively unconscionable portions of pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment in employment contract, while enforcing the remainder of the arbitration provisions).
89. One of the leading examples of a court refusing to enforce the entire contract is Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
90. Mallor, supra note 21.
91. Id.
92. See Warkentine, supra note 60, at 41.
Seattle University Law Review
Decisions based on unconscionability are fact sensitive and, to a
great extent, reflect trial judges' subjective determinations.93 As a result,
although there are now many cases that address unconscionability, they
have little value as precedents. One can make predictions as to the out-
come of a particular case based on how closely the facts resemble a re-
ported decision, but ultimately it will always be necessary to await the
decision of the court.
In summary, the traditional view of contract formation required mu-
tual assent.94  Once a court found assent by focusing on the objective
manifestations of the parties, the court assumed assent to all terms in a
written contract. 95 Parties had a "duty to read" the contents of a con-
96tract. A party's signature on a written document could reasonably be
understood by the other contracting party to mean that there was assent
to everything in that writing. 97 A challenging party might recover based
on particularly harsh or onerous terms under the doctrine of unconscion-
ability.98
III. SCHOLARLY THEORIES REGARDING ENFORCEABILITY
OF STANDARD FORM CONTRACT TERMS
To understand the need for a knowing assent analysis of standard
form contract terms, it is helpful for one to consider some of the schol-
arly theories regarding enforceability of standard form contract terms.99
The critical article on enforceability of standard form contract terms was
Friedrich Kessler's 1943 discussion of contracts of adhesion.'00 That
article was followed by a number of other studies that commented on
Kessler's analysis and offered additional perspectives.' 0 ' This body of
93. Cf Paul Bennett Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of Unconscionability,
53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 187, 187 (2005-06) (providing that determinations about unconscionability are
subjective):
To date no one has been able to articulate an objective standard. Statutes that empower
the judiciary to make findings of unconscionability almost uniformly fail to define what
qualifies.... Judges are left to fashion solutions that they, and they alone, believe ad-
dress their charge. Different results from different judges are what can reasonably be ex-
pected absent an agreed upon definition.
Id.
94. See supra text accompanying note 33.
95. See supra text accompanying note 43.
96. See supra text accompanying note 42.
97. See supra text accompanying note 43.
98. See supra text accompanying note 72.
99. 1 apologize in advance to anyone who I may appear to have neglected.
100. Kessler, supra note 1.
101. A 2008 LEXIS database [US Law Reviews and Journals, Combined] search for
["Kessler" and "contracts of adhesion"] yielded over 300 authorities citing Kessler's work.
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scholarship began to disaggregate the theory of assent in the context of
standard form contracts into two distinct concepts: (1) assent to being
contractually bound and (2) assent to all terms.
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of articles addressing
particular problems in the analysis of standard form contract terms.1
0 2
Some of the renewed interest can be attributed to the rise of Internet con-
tracting, including "shrinkwrap," "clickwrap," and "browseware" con-
tracts. 10 3 Another group of articles focuses on particular terms found in
standard form contracts, such as arbitration and choice of law provi-
sions. °4 Still others were written in response to debates that arose in
connection with proposed legislation, such as Uniform Computer Infor-
mation Transactions Act and revised Article 2 of the UCC.' °5 Finally,
there is also a group of articles written by leading scholars as part of their
participation in symposia on related topics. 0 6  This Part reviews the
scholarly literature in approximate chronological order. It summarizes
each author's suggested analytic approach to standard form contract
terms, examines the extent to which each approach has influenced the
courts, and explores whether each approach provides a useful framework
for a uniform analysis of standard form contract terms.1
0 7
A. Contracts ofAdhesion
In 1943, Friedrich Kessler introduced American scholars to the
concept of contracts of adhesion.'0 8 In an influential piece, he defined
contracts of adhesion as contracts that are drafted by a party with greater
bargaining power than the other contract party and presented for signing
102. A 2008 Westlaw database search [JLR Database] for articles including the phrase "stan-
dard form contract" resulted in 2100 citations. Of those articles, 869 were written within the last ten
years.
103. Assent issues in these contracts are discussed infra Part V.A.
104. See discussion infra Part V.A-B.
105. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
106. See, e.g., Symposium: A Tribute to Professor Joseph M. Perillo, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 523
(2002); Symposium: Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. I
(1997); Symposium: Speeches from The Federalist Society Fifth Annual Lawyers Convention: Indi-
vidual Responsibility and the Law, Panel Ill: The Death of Contract and the Rise of Tort, Contracts
Is Not Dead, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1034 (1992); Symposium "Boilerplate" Foundations of Market
Contracts Symposium, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006).
107. Michael I. Meyerson carefully described some of these scholarly approaches and la-
mented the lack of a generally accepted solution to the issue of consumer standard form contracts.
He proposed his own "modest solution." Over ten years, his own solution has been largely ignored
by the courts. See Meyerson, supra note 9.
108. Kessler, supra note I, at 632.
2008]
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on a "take it or leave it" basis.'0 9 At the time of his article, Kessler noted
that the term "contract of adhesion" was not yet generally recognized in
the legal vocabulary.110 In his view, the common law of standardized
contracts was highly contradictory and confusing."' He questioned
whether the unity of the law of contracts could be maintained in the face
of increasing use of contracts of adhesion.'12 Kessler highlighted the
importance of distinguishing the nature of the bargaining process in
situations involving contracts of adhesion from the traditional paradigm
of negotiations between parties with relatively equal bargaining power.
In recognition of the difference, he urged a new analytic approach to un-
derstanding assent in the context of contracts of adhesion.13
Kessler did not challenge the notion that parties to such contracts
objectively manifest their assent to be bound; rather, he questioned
whether a court's enforcement of onerous terms in such contracts serves
the basic policies underlying contract enforcement in general.1 4 As one
possible solution, Kessler suggested that a court should refuse to enforce
particularly onerous terms when the bargaining power is so unbalanced
that the voluntary nature of the assent is called into question." 5 Kessler
pointed out that courts in the past had twisted doctrine or withheld en-
forcement on equitable grounds rather than facing the special problems
raised by contracts of adhesion.'1 6 He urged that such problems should
be faced squarely, and that courts should recognize the distinct nature of
contracts of adhesion and the resulting problem of the lack of meaningful
assent to such contracts. 17 He stated that "in dealing with standardized
contracts courts have to determine what the weaker contracting party
109. Kessler attributed the term to Patterson in The Delivery of A Life Insurance Policy, 33
HARV. L. REv. 198, 222 (1919). Kessler, supra note 1, at 632. The definition continues to the pre-
sent day. For example, the California Supreme Court defined an adhesion contract as "a standard-
ized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to
the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it." Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).
110. Kessler, supra note 1, at 633.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 636.
113. Id. at 637.
114. Perhaps I am putting words into Kessler's mouth; however, in discussing insurance cases
in particular, he demonstrated that "freedom of contract" was a fiction when standard form contracts
were used by a form drafter imposing one-sided terms on an adhering party who lacked bargaining
power. Id. at 631.
115. Again, Kessler may not have gone quite this far; however, he emphasized the "elasticity
of the common law" and that it was possible for courts to follow the dictates of "social desirability."
Id. at 638.
116. Id. at 633.
117. Id. at 637.
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could legitimately expect by way of services according to the enter-
priser's calling, and to what extent the stronger party disappointed [the
adhering party's] reasonable expectations based on the typical life situa-
tion.1'18
Courts have embraced Kessler's characterization of certain con-
tracts as contracts of adhesion, and many courts employ that characteri-
zation as part of their enforceability analysis.' 19 However, courts will not
necessarily determine that a contract is unenforceable merely because a
contract is characterized as a contract of adhesion. 20 Indeed, most courts
have acknowledged that a contract of adhesion may be enforceable, de-
pending on the circumstances of its formation and its contents.121 Ac-
cordingly, such a characterization has become only part of an enforce-
ability analysis.1
22
Kessler's recognition that certain types of contracts raise new sets
of problems was a major advance in the analysis of assent to terms in
standard form contracts. First, he recognized that the issue of assent to
standard form contract terms requires a different analysis than assent in
the context of a contract reached through negotiations between parties
with relatively equal bargaining power. 23 Second, he suggested that not
all terms in standard form contracts should be enforced, thus departing
from the rigid "objective manifestation of assent" and "duty to read" ap-
proach. 124 In these two ways, Kessler made an important contribution to
developing an approach to analyzing standard form contract terms. He
118. Id.
119. A 2006 Westlaw database search [ALLCASES] for "adhesion w/1 contract & enforce"
limited to the most recent 10 years yielded over 500 cases. In skimming those cases, I observed that
the courts across the country were consistently discussing (1) whether the contract was a contract of
adhesion and (2) if so, whether it was enforceable. The enforceability discussion generally focused
on either unconscionability or undefined "public policy."
120. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1981) ("To describe a
contract as adhesive in character is not to indicate its legal effect. It is, rather, 'the beginning and not
the end of the analysis insofar as enforceability of its terms is concerned."').
121. Id.
122. Note that this Article does not treat unconscionability as a theory of assent, although the
doctrine is certainly an indirect way of addressing the issue of assent. Unconscionability does not
test whether a party assented to a particular term. Rather, as is the case with other contract defenses
such as fraud, duress, and mistake, it tests whether, regardless of the parties' assent, the term is the
type of term that society wishes to enforce. Most courts have accepted an unconscionability analysis
that looks for both procedural and substantive unconscionability. The characterization of a contract
as a contract of adhesion usually constitutes the bulk of a procedural unconscionability analysis.
After that characterization has been made, a court must still determine whether the challenged clause
is substantively unconscionable.
123. Cf Kessler, supra note 1, at 637-38.
124. Kessler, supra note 1, at 637.
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did not, however, offer a concrete approach to analyzing assent in these
contract situations.
B. Blanket Assent
Karl Llewellyn is generally acknowledged to be responsible for in-
troducing the concept of "blanket assent."'125  He recognized that treating
a signature on a written contract as evidence of assent to all of its terms
is a fiction, at least in the case of standard form consumer contracts.
126
To resolve this fiction, he proposed an analytic approach 27 that recog-
nizes that most parties to standard form contracts generally focus only on
the "dickered" contract terms, such as price, quantity, and the subject
matter of the contract. 28 To the extent that a standard form contract con-
tains other terms, Llewellyn maintained that when an adhering party
agrees to be bound to a contract, that party knows that there are other
terms in the contract. 29 Because the party does not bargain over those
other terms, the party should be understood to have agreed to all terms
that would reasonably be expected to be included in the contract. 30  It
should not, however, be understood that the adhering party agreed to un-
usual or unexpected terms.' 3' Rather, because such terms could not rea-
sonably be expected in the contract, it would make more sense to
125. LLEWELLYN, supra note 19, at 370. Llewellyn goes on to provide that
[i]nstead of thinking about "assent" to boilerplate clauses, we can recognize that so far as
concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifi-
cally, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one more.
That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or
indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the rea-
sonable meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print which has not been read has no
business to cut under the meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant
and only real expression of agreement, but much of it commonly belongs in.
Id.
126. Id.
127. This approach is now embodied in § 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See
infra Part IV.A.
128. LLEWELLYN, supra note 19, at 371.
129. Id.
130. For another discussion of Llewellyn's concept that signing a standard form contract
should not be deemed to evidence consent to all terms, see C.M.A. McCauliff, A Historical Ap-
proach to the Contractual Ties that Bind Parties Together, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 841, 845 n.10
(2002). Professor Hillman characterized Llewellyn's approach as meaning that the contract terms
are the bargained-for terms plus all conscionable terms. Although Hillman's characterization is not
exactly what Llewellyn was saying, it appears that as a practical matter, Professor Hillman's charac-
terization is an accurate reflection of what happens. Unless a term is challenged in court on grounds
of unconscionability, all terms are treated as if they have been assented to. Hillman & Raclinski,
supra note 35, at 461.
131. LLEWELLYN, supra note 19, at 371.
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anticipate that such agreement was lacking.1 32 Accordingly, Llewellyn's
concept of "blanket assent" binds parties to all of the terms in the con-
tract except those that a reasonable person would not expect to be in-
cluded in the contract.1
33
Llewellyn's theory is probably best understood as a rejection of the
traditional approach of finding an objective manifestation of assent, cou-
pled with a duty to read. Llewellyn argued that courts cannot reasonably
determine that a party manifested agreement to terms that no reasonable
person would have expected to find if the form contract had indeed been
read or understood.134 Even the "classic" objective theory of assent rec-
ognized that if one contract party knows that the other attributes a differ-
ent meaning to terms, the meaning attributed by the party who is un-
aware of a discrepancy controls. 35  By extension, Llewellyn reasoned
that the standard form contract drafter should be aware that the adhering
party is unlikely to read or understand the entire standard form con-
tract.' 36  However, instead of concluding that standard form contract
terms should not be considered to be part of the contract, Llewellyn pro-
posed an approach that includes most of such terms. 137 Specifically,
terms that the adhering party would normally anticipate would be
deemed to have been agreed to; only terms that could not reasonably
have been anticipated would be unenforceable.
38
The importance of Llewellyn's approach is manifested by its wide
adoption by courts and commentators. 39 Its widespread acceptance is




135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 201(2)(a)-(b) (1981). Section 201 pro-
vides the following:
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement or a
term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one of them if
at the time the agreement was made (a) that party did not know of any different meaning
attached by the other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or (b)
that party had no reason to know of any different meanings attached by the other, and the
other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.
Id.
136. LLEWELLYN, supra note 19, at 371.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. For representative cases citing Llewellyn and specifically tracking his discussion of blan-
ket assent, see, e.g., Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Algona v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 618
(Iowa 1984); Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-lsuzu, Inc., 730 SW.2d 634, 637 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1987).
140. Professors Hillman and Raclinski provide an explanation for Llewellyn's approach:
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the UCC reflects Llewellyn's approach. 41  His approach is also embod-
ied, to some extent, in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 211.142
However, some scholars have criticized Llewellyn's attempt to make
traditional contract doctrine apply to transactions that no longer resemble
the paradigmatic bargain that underlay the traditional doctrine. 143 These
scholars stressed the differences between a transaction based on a stan-
dard form contract and a negotiated bargain reached by parties with
roughly equivalent bargaining power; while it makes sense to find assent
to all terms contained in a negotiated contract, such assent is lacking
when standard form contracts are signed. 144 For these reasons, a differ-
ent analysis of assent to standard form contract terms is needed.
C. "Invisible" Terms
Todd Rakoff agreed with Llewellyn's conclusion that contract par-
ties typically are concerned only with "dickered terms," but he reached a
different conclusion regarding enforceability of non-dickered terms in
standard form contracts.145 Rakoff asserted that because parties who as-
sent to standard form contracts only agree to dickered terms (and any
terms not dickered but clearly known to the adherent), their rejection of
non-dickered terms should be presumed. 146  Thus, he proposed that
Llewellyn's approach to paper-form contracting resonates closely with the rational, so-
cial, and cognitive explanations for why users refrain from reading standard form provi-
sions. It recognizes the reality of contracting in that users rationally fail to read boiler-
plate, are induced not to read boilerplate, and underestimate the importance of the terms
contained in the boilerplate.
Hillman & Raclinski, supra note 35, at 463.
141. David Slawson explained why Article 2 adopted the concept of blanket assent:
Article 2, however, is firmly fixed in the old meaning of contract. Its many interpretive
provisions rest on the assumption that it is the writings that the parties exchanged that are
being interpreted, and its requirements of conspicuousness all apply to the terms or ex-
pressions in those writings." The article also contains provisions that make contracts in-
operative to the extent they are "unreasonable" or "unconscionable." Since Karl Lle-
wellyn was the principal architect of the article, it is reasonable to conclude that these are
the equivalents of his concept of "blanket assent" which he said does not go so far as to
include any terms that are "indecent" or "unreasonable."
W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Stan-
dard Forms, 46 U. PITr. L. REV. 21,56-57 (1984).
142. Section 211 is set forth in full and discussed at length infra Part IV.A.
143. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 544 (1971) (arguing that standard form contracts are not
"contracts" ).
144. See, e.g., King, supra note 30, at 915 ("matters not discussed and agreed upon by both
parties should not be enforceable under general contract theory").
145. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1174, 1187 (1983).
146. Id. at 1251.
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subordinate (non-dickered) contract terms, which he called "invisible
terms," should be presumptively unenforceable. 147  Unlike the "blanket
assent" approach, Rakoff's approach shifts the burden of arguing assent
from the adhering party to the drafter. 148 Rather than requiring the adher-
ing party to go to court to argue that particular terms could not have been
reasonably anticipated and therefore were not assented to, Rakoff's ap-
proach would require the form drafter to prove the "visibility" of "invisi-
ble terms.', 149 In other words, rather than presuming that all terms were
part of the parties' contract, Rakoff began with the presumption that only
dickered contract terms were part of the parties' agreement. 
50
Courts did not seem to pay significant attention to Rakoff's "invisi-
ble terms" approach.151 Instead, courts prefer to try to fit all "contract"
transactions into the traditional paradigm and traditional assent analy-
sis. 152  The "invisible terms" approach is ignored by courts because it
flatly contradicts the traditional "duty to read" approach.
Most of the scholarly discussion of Rakoff's approach is critical.
53
The strongest criticism of Rakoff s approach has come from proponents
of the law and economics school, who stress the importance of standard
form contracts in commerce and the need to permit sellers to control the
risks inherent in any transaction by writing appropriate protections into
their form contracts.1 54  These critics argue that ignoring a seller-form
147. Id. at 1245.
148. Id. at 1246.
149. Rakoff goes even further. He states that even if the drafting party tries to show that an
invisible term should be upheld, the court cannot evaluate that showing without determining how the
case would come out absent the form clause, taking into account the background rule and the reason
for deviation from the background rule. Id. at 1258.
150. Id. at 1251.
151. Westlaw and LEXIS database searches for ["Rakoff' and "invisible terms"] yielded no
results. Searches for "Todd B. Rakoff" yielded a handful of cases citing Rakoff, supra note 145, but
references were to his definition of a contract of adhesion only. His analytic approach was neither
discussed nor followed by these courts.
152. See discussion infra Part V.
153. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Standard Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 627, 633 (2002) (applauding Rakoff's discussion of the value of standard form contracts, but
lamenting his approach to "visible" and "invisible" terms).
154. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How
Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104
MICH. L. REV. 857, 862 (2000).
The suggested solutions of some academics, such as Todd Rakoff's proposal that (under
circumstances identified by a seven-factor test) courts impose a fiduciary obligation on
sellers of consumer goods and services to act only in the consumer's interest, rather than
in the interest of their own firm's profit and sales goals, apparently represented too great
a departure from the background principles of free markets for the courts to adopt.
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drafter's efforts at risk-avoidance by refusing to enforce "invisible
terms" would increase the seller's legal exposure, which the seller would
address either by raising prices or by removing goods from the market-
place.155 Because they wish to avoid these undesirable results, these crit-
ics reject Rakoff s analytic approach.
Although Rakoff s conclusion has not been widely adopted, many
commentators cite portions of his analysis with approval.156 Adopting a
knowing assent requirement could limit the "invisible terms" approach
by excising only the most egregious of standard form contract terms, thus
creating a meaningful compromise between adopting Rakoff's approach
in full and flatly rejecting it.
D. Contracts as Sales of Promises, or "Things"
Two scholars, W. David Slawson'57 and Arthur Leff,158 both sug-
gested in separate articles that agreements based on standard forms
should be analyzed differently than traditional contracts because transac-
tions based on standard forms lack assent. 59 They argued that standard
form contracts should be treated differently than negotiated contracts,
and proposed that the term "contract" be reserved to refer to an enforce-
able agreement that results from a meaningful bargaining process.
160
Because standard form contract transactions do not entail bargaining,
both Slawson and Leff believed that standard form contracts should be
viewed as commodities.161
Slawson believed that standard form contracts should be enforced
because of the valuable role they play in our economic system; however,
he preferred not to analyze such contracts under the traditional paradigm
155. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006). The authors argue that a "one-sided contract"
(defined as one with terms that favor the seller) may be preferred ex ante by informed parties as a
cheaper mechanism for inducing efficient outcomes, should contingencies arise during the perform-
ance of the contract, than a more "balanced" contract that, because of imperfect enforcement, could
create costs as a consequence of consumers' enforcing protective provisions in the contract.
156. See, e.g., Daxton R. Stewart, The Promise ofArbitration: Can it Succeed in Journalism as
it has in Other Businesses?, 6 APPALACHIAN J. L. 135, 143 (2006) (using Rakoffs definition of
adhesion contracts, suggesting "Professor Todd Rakoff. . . created a foundation for modem review
of adhesion contracts in his 1983 article in the Harvard Law Review.").
157. Slawson, supra note 143, at 541; W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in
California, 48 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1974).
158. Arthur Leff, Contract as Thing, 19AM. U. L. REV. 131, 141-44 (1970).
159. Slawson, supra note 157, at 13; Leff, supra note 158, at 147.
160. Slawson, supra note 143, at 540; Slawson, supra note 157, at 54; Leff, supra note 158, at
147.
161. Slawson, supra note 143, at 544; Leff, supra note 158, at 150.
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that courts use to justify enforcement. 162 Slawson chose to characterize
these transactions as sales of promises.1 63 He argued that what a buyer-
adhering party is buying and what a seller-form drafter is selling is a set
of promises.' 64 This set of promises includes a promise by the seller to
transfer goods or services with specific attributes and to undertake spe-
cific responsibilities. 65 The only thing the buyer can buy is what the
seller is selling. Thus, the fiction of the buyer's "assent" to such terms is
not necessary. What the buyer buys is the set of promises (the contract
terms) that the seller is selling.
Leff went even further. He noted a "conceptual move" to create a
new subcategory of contracts called "contracts of adhesion," but sug-
gested that although this new category was a "brilliant coup" as an ana-
lytic device, as a practical matter it was a "disaster."'166 Rather, he sug-
gested that the law should recognize that such transactions represent the
sale of "things" offered for sale on a "take it or leave it" basis. 167 Be-
cause the parties do not negotiate, there is no question as to which terms
in a written agreement bind the parties. The "thing" that the seller sells
is a package, which consists of a physical product plus "contract terms"
chosen by the seller. When the buyer purchases the "thing," the buyer is
purchasing not only the physical product, but also the set of seller's
terms that make up the rest of the package. 68 As a result, the buyer is
bound by all of the terms in a standard form contract, whether or not he
or she is aware of and understands the terms.
169
As with the "invisible terms" approach, courts have not adopted the
"contract as commodity" approach. Other scholars have criticized the
approach because it represents an attempt to take the analysis of standard
form contracts, especially adhesion contracts, outside of the realm of tra-
ditional contract law. 170 These critics want to retain a unitary theory of
mutual assent to contracts rather than carve out a separate category of
"things" that are "not contracts."' 71 Some critics observe that the "con-
tract as commodity" approach effectively results in the enforcement of
162. Slawson, supra note 143, at 532.
163. Id. at 546.
164. Id. Alternatively, Slawson described what the buyer was purchasing as "property" in the
sense that the standard forms principally confer rights on a consumer, rather than impose duties.
Slawson, supra note 157, at 14.
165. Slawson, supra note 141, at 39.
166. Leff, supra note 158, at 142.
167. Id. at 147-48.
168. Id. at 147.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Meyerson, supra note 9.
171. Id.
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all terms in standard form contracts, because the standard form sets forth
the extent of the seller's promises. 172 As these critics have observed, the
adoption of such a view recognizes that parties to standard form con-
tracts lack any bargaining power. The scholars apparently conclude that
sellers can impose any onerous terms they desire with impunity.1
73
Some scholars have pointed out, however, that the "contract as
thing" analytic approach need not automatically result in a court's en-
forcement of all terms in a standard form contract. John J. A. Burke ex-
panded on the concept of "contract as commodity" in a series of articles
that began with his work on behalf of the New Jersey Law Revision
Commission. 1 4  Burke explained that when the nature of contract as
commodity is recognized,
[A] buyer cannot argue that he did not really buy the terms be-
cause he did not understand them just as a buyer cannot argue
that he did not buy a radio because he did not understand transis-
tors. The buyer owns the new contract. The only relevant legal
questions are which standardized terms should be enforced as re-
corded, and which legal norms should govern their enforce-
ment.175
Professor Burke demonstrated that this analytic approach, if com-
bined with appropriate legislation, could be a meaningful solution to the
problem of unbargained-for standard form contract terms. Essentially,
Burke introduced a legislative approach to requiring "knowing assent."
He recognized, as did Arthur Leff,176 that we are already accustomed to
legislative regulation of commodities for the good of the consumer.177
Similarly, we are already familiar with legislation governing contract
172. Id.
173. While working for the New Jersey Law Revision Commission, Burke proposed that these
types of contracts require displacing conventional rules and legal analysis of contract law. His work
on the Commission led to proposed legislation. See discussion infra Part V.
174. John J. A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 285 (2000).
175. Burke goes on to provide that
a standard form contract is a series of terms embedded by a seller in products marketed
for mass distribution and consumption .... When the buyer purchases the product, the
buyer also purchases the terms, thereby recording the parties' legal rights and obligations
resulting from the sale .... Embedded terms are neither an exchange of promises nor an
agreement reflecting a meeting of the minds between the parties.
Id. at 308-09.
176. Leff, supra note 158, at 149.
177. For example, federal law authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe standards
for automobile safety. 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (1994). The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act author-




terms. For example, the Federal Magnuson-Moss Consumer Warranty
Act 178 proscribes or limits sellers' ability to disclaim implied warranties
in specified situations. 179 It should also be possible, then, to enact gov-
ernmental standards to legislate the qualities of the "contract as commod-
ity. '
180
E. Meyerson's Application of the Objective Theory ofAssent
Professor Michael Meyerson has argued persuasively that even un-
der the traditional objective theory of contract formation, not all standard
form contract terms should be enforced. 181 He emphasized that the tradi-
tional analysis finds assent to terms based on the outward manifestations
of the parties. 82 In particular, he noted that it has always been the case
that parties do not manifest mutual assent to an exchange if they attach
materially different meanings to their manifestations.' 8 3  Furthermore,
when the parties attach different meanings to terms, and one of the par-
ties is aware of that fact while the other is not, the meaning of the party
who is unaware of the difference controls if the term is disputed.1
8 4
Applying this traditional approach to the issue of assent to standard
form contract terms, Meyerson reasoned that form drafters know that it is
unlikely that adhering parties will read the standard form. 8 5 They also
know that if the adhering party reads the standard form, the party is
unlikely to understand it.'8 6 In other words, the form drafter should un-
derstand that the adhering party is attaching a more limited meaning to
the standard form contract (the bargained-for terms only) than is the form
drafter (the bargained-for terms plus the additional unbargained-for
terms). Because the adhering party is probably unaware of a particular
contract term, and the form drafter knows that, the adhering party's un-
derstanding (that the unbargained-for term is not part of the contract)
178. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2000).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 2308.
180. For an example of how federal legislation could impact the enforceability of dispute reso-
lution provisions in standard form contracts, see Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution
Provisions in Adhesion Contracts, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1998) (proposing language for a
statute to "prevent the use of dispute resolution clauses to diminish the value of statutory rights
devised and to protect 'one-shot players' (employees, local franchisees and consumers) from eco-
nomic predation by 'repeat players'). For a discussion of other legislative approaches to regulating
content in standard form contracts, see infra Part IV.
181. Meyerson, supra note 9, at 1299.
182. Id. at 1266.
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(1) (1981).
184. Id. § 20(2).
185. Meyerson, supra note 9, at 1271.
186. Id.
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should prevail. 187 Meyerson explained, "[b]ecause the drafters of these
contracts know not only that their forms will not be read, but also that it
is reasonable for consumers to sign them unstudied, a reasonable drafter
should have no illusion that there has been true assent to these terms. ' 1 8
It follows that unexpected terms would not be part of the contract.
1 89
Although Meyerson's approach to analyzing standard form contract
terms gives courts a means to overcome the fiction of assent while using
traditional contract analysis, courts have not adopted his approach.190
F. Reasonable Expectations
Robert Keeton is particularly known for his explanation of the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations and its application to the interpretation
of insurance contracts. 191 Summarizing the approach, he stated that "ob-
jectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1265. Some may argue that Meyerson is not really applying the traditional objective
theory of assent; that theory emphasized the parties' understanding of the meaning of terms. Meyer-
son would extend that approach to the very existence of contract terms.
189. Id. at 1291.
190. A 2008 Westlaw [ALLCASES] database search of [Meyerson and "reunification of con-
tract"] yielded one case. The same search in the LEXIS database yielded two cases-one was a
duplicate. In In re Shirel, the court declared void a security agreement on the grounds that a reason-
able person would not understand the reference to "all merchandise" to include a refrigerator. 251
B.R. 157, 161 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2000). The court cited with approval Meyerson's position that
under the objective theory of contracts the drafter of a long convoluted form agreement reasonably
expects the consumer to sign without reading or understanding the agreement, and that in such a case
one could argue that the consumer is only assenting to the central terms such as price, interest, and
minimum payments. Id. It noted that under this argument the only way to have mutual assent to the
obscure terms would be to emphasize and explain them to the consumer. Id. In deciding the case,
however, the court noted that the record was devoid of any evidence regarding whether or not there
was genuine assent, and ultimately decided the case on other grounds. Id. The second case was
Rory v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23 (Mich. 2005). That case involved the enforceability of a
one-year limitation clause in an insurance policy. Id. The Meyerson article was only referenced as
part of the court's discussion of adhesion contracts.
191. For a helpful reference to a body of literature regarding Keeton's "reasonable expecta-
tions" approach, see Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 729, 779 n. 1 (2000) (citing
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, (pts. I & 2), 83 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 1281 (1970)). Since 1970, Professor Keeton's groundbreaking doctrine of reasonable
expectations has received widely mixed support and criticism from a number of American courts and
commentators. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance:
Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981) (noting that the
expectations principle is used by courts to favor policyholders in disputes with insurers).
Beyond Unconscionability
expectations."' 192 Keeton suggested that in view of the adhesive nature of
insurance contracts and the imbalance of power between insurer and in-
sureds, courts should interpret insurance policies based on the expecta-
tions of an ordinary reader as to the contents of the policy. 193  Even
though Keeton's analysis focused on insurance contracts, the reasoning
and principles arguably apply to all standard form contracts. This point
of view is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which in-
corporates a type of reasonable expectations test into its treatment of
standard form contracts.194
A primary critique of this doctrine is that it is based largely on as-
sumptions about how people entering into (insurance) contracts behave
and what expectations they have at that time. 195 Critics challenge both
the assumptions and the resulting conclusions that are reached regarding
the parties' "reasonable expectations."
' 96
John J. A. Burke summarized criticisms of the reasonable expecta-
tions test by suggesting that neither courts nor parties are likely to know
the consequences of applying the test to any particular set of facts.1 97
First, whose expectations are measured? A court may look to the expec-
tations of: (1) the litigant; (2) the hypothetical consumer; or (3) the hypo-
thetical reasonable person.198 Second, what is the source of the reason-
able expectation? Possible sources include: (1) an ambiguous term in the
contract; (2) the subjective preference of the insured; or (3) objectively
independent expectations?1 99 Judges often bitterly dispute the meaning
and effect of the test 200 which has become a muddled and protean
192. Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After
Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 824 (1990) (citing Keeton, supra note 191, at 967).
193. Id.
194. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
195. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doc-
trine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (1989) (arguing that the reasonable expectations doctrine should be
abandoned); Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doc-
trine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295 (1998) (identifying and then challenging assumptions upon which the
reasonable expectations doctrine is based, using research from consumer psychology and survey data
collected from insureds, and reassessing the doctrine in light of the problematical nature of its as-
sumptions).
196. See e.g., James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315
(1997) (analyzing twenty-five Arizona appellate decisions applying the reasonable expectations
doctrine and noting courts' disagreement over whether the expectations of the particular plaintiff
consumer or some hypothetical consumer are to be considered); Thomas, supra note 195 (arguing
that the courts' determination of "reasonable expectations" is, in many cases, fiction that allows
them to impose their own view of fairness).
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judicial doctrine that lacks a uniform and accepted definition within the
common law. 20' The reasonable expectations test essentially posits that
the source of contract terms is outside the written contract and that the
written contract itself does not represent the parties' agreement.20 2 This
permits courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the authoring
party and to legislate contract standards without the support of clear
rules.20 3 Consequently, the doctrine does not produce predictable re-
suits.
20 4
In a study of cases involving the reasonable expectations approach,
Professor Jeffrey Stempel traced the expansion and reduction of the
"doctrine" and its applicability in insurance cases. He emphasized its use
as a tool of interpretation. 20 5 Few courts have further expanded its appli-
cability outside of the insurance field.
G. Consent
Randy Barnett argues that contracts are best analyzed with what he
terms the "consent" theory, rather than the "promise" theory that pre-
dominates scholarly thinking.20 6 He has written at length about the con-
sent theory generally, as well as about its specific application in a court's
analysis of standard form contracts.20 7 His basic contention is that there
201. Id.
202. Id. at 303.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Ex-
pectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of the Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181
(1998-1999).
206. Randy E. Barnett draws a distinction between the assent that is critical to the issue of
formation or enforceability (assent to be legally bound) and the assent to perform or refrain from
performing a certain act. A particular duty to perform-the promise or commitment-is nested
within an overall consent to be legally bound. The consent that legitimates enforcement is the latter
consent to be legally bound. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Standard Form Contracts, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 635-36 (2002) (citing Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986)); Randy E. Barnett,... And Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 421 (1993); see also Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1022 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract,
9 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 62 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Internal and External Analysis of Concepts,
11 CARDOzO L. REV. 525 (1990); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Con-
tractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 866 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inal-
ienable Rights, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 179 (1986); Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory
and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 783 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract
Theory, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1969 (1987).
207. See supra text accompanying note 206.
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are no special problems that arise out of the use of standard form con-
tracts; rather, the problem is with the promise theory.2 °8 He states:
[H]ostility towards form contracts stems in important part from an
implicit adoption of a promise-based conception of contractual ob-
ligation. . . .[W]hen one adopts (a) a consent theory of contract
based not on promise but on the manifested intention to be legally
bound and (b) a properly objective interpretation of this consent,
form contracts can be seen as entirely legitimate-though some
form terms may properly be subject to judicial scrutiny that would
be inappropriate with non-form agreements.
'" 20 9
Bamett argues that a consent-based analysis of standard form con-
tracts meets the challenges posed by other scholars such as Rakoff.
210
Those scholars argue that an assent-based analysis compels a court to
conclude that the adhering party who neither knows nor understands
many of the standard form contract terms should not be bound by
them.211 Barnett's consent-based analysis rests on the parties' overall
consent to be legally bound.212 He likens this assent to a party promising
to do whatever is asked in a sealed envelope.1 3 If someone gives that
consent, he reasons, why should he or she not fulfill that promise, even
though he or she may not know what is contained in the sealed enve-
lope?214 Barnett finds that a court legitimately enforces all of the stan-
dard form contract terms when a party manifests consent to be legally
bound, although he does concede that there may be more circumstances
in which judicial "policing" of particular unbargained-for terms is neces-
sary in standard form contracts than in the case of negotiated tailored
contracts. 215 "True," he says, "when consenting in this manner one is
running the risk of binding oneself to a promise one may regret when
208. Barnett, supra note 153, at 634 et seq.
209. Id. at 627.
210. Id. at 632, 634.
211. Rakoff, supra note 145, at 1195.
212. Barnett, supra note 208, at 635.
213. Id. at 636.
214. My colleague, Professor Patricia Leary, criticizes Barnett's reasoning for his failure to
understand human nature. In fact, she suggests, most people would not give such a promise. She
argues that if people who sign standard form contracts were actually given a sealed envelope and
told that they were agreeing to secret terms, known only to the more powerful party, these transac-
tions would look very different. In fact, she suggests that the typical standard form contract transac-
tion may better be analogized to a situation where the form drafter misleads the adhering party into
believing that the envelope contents are disclosed when in fact the envelope is sealed.
215. Barnett, supra note 208, at 637.
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later learning its content. But the law does not, and should not, bar all
assumptions of risk.,
216
What Barnett ignores with this statement is the fact that the doctrine
of assumption of the risk is based on a knowing assumption of the risk.21 7
Thus, except where there is express assent (meaning assent to the par-
ticular terms) 2 18 a plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm arising from
the defendant's conduct unless he both knows of the existence of the risk
and appreciates its unreasonable character.219 By proper analogy to the
doctrine of assumption of the risk, an adhering party should not be bound
to a contract term unless the party both knows of the existence of the par-
ticular contract provisions and appreciates their meaning.22 °
A detailed critique of Barnett's consent theory is beyond the scope
of this article. 221 Even if a court were to adopt that theory, it must still
determine when parties have manifested the "consent" to which Barnett
refers. However, most courts have remained true to the traditional "ob-
jective manifestation of assent" analysis, both with respect to negotiated
contracts and non-negotiated standard form contracts, and continue to
enforce these contracts.222
H. Rolling Contracts
New means of entering into contracts, such as contracting over the
Internet, have inspired new approaches to contract analysis. One of the
most recent and frequently-criticized approaches to analyzing assent to
unbargained-for terms in standard form contracts is known as a "rolling
contract" analysis.223 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit introduced the idea that contract formation can take place
over time, with terms "rolling" into the contract by virtue of inaction, in
216. Id. at 636.
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 496B (1985).
218. Id.
219. Id. at § 496D.
220. In fact, this would be the result under a "knowing assent" analysis.
221. For such a critique, see Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regula-
tory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990); Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in
Contracts: A Critique of Consent Theory, 54 MONT. L. REV. 169 (1993).
222. Cf Deborah Zalesne, Enforcing the Contract at all (Social) Costs: The Boundary Between
Private Contract Law and the Public Interest, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 579, 585 (2005) (explor-
ing "the limitations on the ability of contract law to deal with the protection of third parties and the
public").
223. An entire symposium was devoted to the idea of a "common sense" approach, as sug-




ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg224 and expanded on it in Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc.
2 25
The rolling contract approach recognizes that a contract is formed
over a period of time. In ProCD, a buyer purchased software in a box at
a retail store, and later opened the box, which contained the terms and
conditions of a software license. 6 The court stated that the contract was
not formed when the purchase at the retail store took place; rather, a con-
tract including the software license was formed later when the buyer
found the license (which provided that retention of the software consti-
tuted acceptance of all the terms of the license) and retained the soft-
ware. 227 The court explained that transactions in which the exchange of
money precedes the communication of detailed terms are common. 228 If
the customer has an opportunity to reject the goods after receiving the
terms and fails to do so, the customer is deemed to have accepted the
seller's terms.229 In short, the contract has rolled to the point of forma-
tion-and it contains all of the seller's desired terms.230
The rolling contract theory appears to have been developed for the
express purpose of assuring that terms that are not disclosed at the time
of contract formation will nevertheless be incorporated into the contract
without the assent of one of the contract parties.231 Judge Easterbrook
wrote, "[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return
the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable . . . may be a
means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike.2 32 The
theory is defective when weighed against all traditional analyses of
224. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (software license contained in shrinkwrap was an "offer"
that buyer accepted by failing to return the product).
225. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (contract terms, including arbitration clause, which were
contained in box in which computer which had been ordered by telephone was shipped to buyer and
which provided that terms governed sale unless customer returned computer within 30 days, were
binding on buyer who did not return computer).
226. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
227. Id. at 1451.
228. Id. at 1451.
229. Id.
230. Id. Because of this analysis, these types of contracts are also sometimes referred to as
"layered contracts" or "payment now-terms later" contracts. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Commen-
tary, Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust the Courts: The Case Against Enforcing Delayed
Mass-Market Terms, Especially for Software, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 753, 757 (2004).
23 1. Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Decep-
tive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805 (2000).
232. ProCD, Inc. 86 F.3d at 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).
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contract formation and the modem approach of the UCC, which should
control the analysis of contract formation in transactions in goods.233
Under traditional contract law, a contract is formed when the parties
manifest agreement to the same bargain.234 Any attempt to 'add' terms at
a later point in time would be viewed as an offer to modify the already-
existing contract. 235 The traditional rule also states that silence is not
acceptance except in rare circumstances, such as where a prior relation-
ship would give a party a duty to speak.236 Terms sent after contract
formation do not become part of the contract without express assent to
them.237 Under the UCC, such changes should also be analyzed as unilat-
eral attempts to modify an existing contract. These terms do not become
part of a modified contract without the assent of both parties.238
Depending on the exact facts, the situation may be one that should
be analyzed under UCC section 2-207, which governs written confirma-
tions that contain additional or different terms.239 Under that section,
after contract formation, additional terms in a written confirmation are
proposals for addition to the contract. 240 Those proposals become part of
233. For an extended discussion of the appropriate legal analysis of this fact pattern, see Wil-
liam H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over Contract Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1099
(2004).
234. See supra text accompanying note 33.
235. Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 745 (2002).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 19 (1981).
237. 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.15 (2d ed. 1998). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 69. In this connection, courts have consistently determined that no contract is
found if a seller sends unsolicited merchandise to a consumer with the suggestion that if the con-
sumer retains the goods, he or she will be obligated to pay. There is no logical reason for treating
differently the situation in which a seller sends additional contract terms to a buyer with the sugges-
tion that unless the buyer sends the goods back, the buyer will be obligated to all of the additional
contract terms.
238. U.C.C. § 2-209 (2003). For a discussion of contract modification in this context and
relevant cases, see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 36-37,
n.22 (Practitioner's Edition, 3d ed. 1988).
239. Note that Judge Easterbrook erroneously stated, "Our case has only one form; U.C.C. § 2-
207 is irrelevant." ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996). He ignored the
fact that § 2-207(1) specifically includes a reference to "written confirmations," which was the form
used in ProCD.
240. Although U.C.C. § 2-207(1) describes written confirmations that include "additional or
different" terms, section 2-207(2) specifically refers to only "additional" terms. There is a jurisdic-
tional split regarding whether section 2-207(2) properly governs the disposition of "different" terms
as well as "additional" terms. See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt, Inc. 741 F.2d 1569, 1578 (10th
Cir. 1984) (holding that conflicting terms should not be analyzed under § 2-207(2)); Gardner Zemke
Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319 (N.M. 1993) (suggesting section 2-207(2) does not apply to
"different terms;" different terms in offer and acceptance are "knocked out"); Contra Steiner v.
Mobile Oil Corp., 569 P.2d 751, 759-60 n.5 (Cal. 1977) (stating that the applicability of § 2-207
subdivision (2), should not turn upon a characterization of the varying terms of an acceptance as
"additional" or "different"); Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d 520, 527 (Mo. Ct.
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the contract only if the parties expressly assent to them, except when
both parties are merchants.24' If both parties are merchants, the propos-
als may become part of the contract, unless (a) the offer expressly limits
acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) the terms are "material altera-
tions"; or (c) notification of objection to them has been given or is
given. 42 Under any of these analyses, additional terms imposed by the
seller would not somehow "roll into" the contract, if the buyer retained
the already-paid-for goods, simply because the seller included a form in
the packaging that listed terms and said, "if you don't like our terms,
send our product back.,
243
Scholarly criticism of the "rolling contract" approach is abun-
dant.244 However, a number of courts have followed that approach, par-
ticularly in connection with Internet contracts. 245 As is discussed below,
however, there is no reason to create a distinct analysis of contract for-
mation for Internet contracting.246 The rolling contract approach repre-
sents bad judicial reasoning, and it should not be followed.
App. 1981) (providing in spite of the omission, "different" terms are to be analyzed under § 2-
207(2)).
241. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2003). See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D.
Kan. 2000) (holding that arbitration provisions contained in Standard Terms and Conditions in-
cluded in instruction manuals shipped with computer are not part of agreement); Step-Saver Data
Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991) (held printed terms on computer software
package are not part of agreement); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp.
759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that license agreement shipped with computer software not part of
agreement).
242. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2003).
243. The District Court for the Northern District of Kansas properly analyzed similar facts in
Klocek v. Gateway, where it provided the following:
Gateway has not presented evidence that plaintiff expressly agreed to those Standard
Terms. Gateway states only that it enclosed the Standard Terms inside the computer box
for plaintiff to read afterwards. It provides no evidence that it informed plaintiff of the
five-day review-and-retum period as a condition of the sales transaction, or that the par-
ties contemplated additional terms to the agreement .... The Court finds that the act of
keeping the computer ... was not sufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiff expressly
agreed to the Standard Terms.
103 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (D. Kan. 2000).
244. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 233 (criticizing approaches advanced by advocates of the
rolling contract concept).
245. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
("There is no agreement or contract upon placement of the order or even upon the receipt of the
goods .... It is only after the consumer has affirmatively retained the merchandise for more than 30
days ... that the contract has been effectuated.").
246. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 35 (discussing the rationale for the current legal
approach to paper-form contracts and whether e-commerce creates a different environment requiring
a new legal approach).
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. Circle of Assent
Professor Robert M. Lloyd has described the "circle of assent" doc-
trine as a new way of dealing with standard-form contracts.247 Professor
Lloyd attributes the creation of this doctrine to the Tennessee courts.248
He describes the doctrine as "the party who signs a printed form fur-
nished by the other party will be bound by the provisions in the form
over which the parties actually bargained and such other provisions that
are not unreasonable in view of the circumstances surrounding the trans-
action., 249 This doctrine appears to be a variation of both the "blanket
assent" doctrine introduced by Karl Llewellyn, 250 as well as the "reason-
able expectations" approach of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.25'
To date, it has not been adopted in other jurisdictions.252
J. Summary
Common themes and conclusions run throughout the literature on
standard form contracts. Commentators uniformly agree that at least one
party's subjective assent-in the sense of knowing and understanding
terms and wanting them to be part of the contract-is usually lacking in
standard form contract transactions. Although no commentator is willing
to come out and say the inquiry should be about subjective, rather than
objective, assent, it is plain that subjective assent to some terms is lack-
ing in transactions based on standard form contracts.253
One group of commentators would solve the dilemma by adhering
to the doctrine of objective assent to contract formation, and "policing"
the enforceability of certain terms.2 54 Depending on the commentator,
247. See Robert M. Lloyd, The "Circle of Assent " Doctrine: An Important Innovation in Con-
tract Law, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 237 (2006).
248. Although Professor Lloyd suggests that this approach is innovative, it is interesting to
note that Professor John E. Murray discussed the scope of the contractual obligation, which he re-
ferred to as "the circle of assent" as early as 1975 in his article, The Parol Evidence Process and
Standardized Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1342
(1975).
249. Id. at 239 (citing Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
250. See supra text accompanying note 125.
251. See supra text accompanying note 191.
252. A 2008 Westlaw database search of "circle of assent" in the "all states" database yielded
sixteen cases. Of these, eleven were from Tennessee, four were from California, and one was from
Virginia.
253. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 19.
254. See Rakoff, supra note 145, at 1197 (citing Llewellyn, Kessler, Leff, and Slawson as
examples of scholars who advocated some form of the modem doctrine of presumed enforceability
coupled with expanded alleviating doctrines).
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that approach would eliminate either all non-dickered terms, 255 only
those terms that a reasonable person entering in the contract would not
expect to find, 256 only unconscionable terms, or terms that otherwise vio-
late public policy.257 Yet another group would rationalize a finding that
all of the seller's terms are incorporated in the contract.
258
What is apparent from the literature, however, is scholarly recogni-
tion that the use of standard form contracts raises the issue of assent to
individual terms, an issue which must be disaggregated from the issue of
overall assent to be bound to a contract.259 The only doctrine remaining
to protect unwary adhering parties is unconscionability. The proposed
knowing assent analysis is preferable because it represents an opportu-
nity to give more protection to adhering parties than these other analyses.
Most of the commentators discussed above are apparently content
to let the status quo continue; however, not all commentators agree. John
J.A. Burke suggested that a legislative approach would be desirable. In-
deed, several legislative and quasi-legislative bodies have attempted to
frame an approach to determining the enforceability of standard form
contract terms.
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO
ANALYZING STANDARD FORM CONTRACT TERM ENFORCEABILITY
When courts and commentators cannot agree on a uniform ap-
proach to analysis, legislative action may provide a solution. Unfortu-
nately, it is highly unlikely that the legislature will solve the issue of as-
sent to standard form contract terms. In the last decade, legislative de-
bate has become heated as a result of several specific legislative propos-
als. 260 Very few states ultimately adopted these proposals. 261  To some
extent, the absence of a consensus on this type of legislation is explained
262by the conflicting interests of consumers and businesses. Yet another
255. See Rakoff, supra note 145, at 1243 ("to justify enforcement of any form term, to the
extent that it deviates from background law, cause must be shown").
256. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 191 and accompanying text.
257. LLEWELLYN, supra note 19.
258. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 208 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 19; Meyerson, supra note 9; Slawson, supra note 141.
260. Some of these efforts are discussed at length infra Part IV of this Article.
261. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
262. It is harder to understand the courts' failure to apply the "reasonable expectations" test
beyond the area of insurance or the version of that test represented by the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 211. In his comprehensive article arguing for the adoption of that test, Professor Barnes
did not postulate any reasons for this failure. Perhaps John J.A. Burke's critique of these approaches
is the best reason for courts' failure to adopt that test. It may be that judges do not feel comfortable
identifying the "reasonable expectations" of adhering parties in any given situation.
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explanation is that several recent legislative efforts intended to directly
address the consent issue were part of legislative packages that were con-
troversial for other reasons.263 Nevertheless, it is helpful to review some
of the legislative and quasi-legislative efforts that address the issue of
assent to standard form contract terms, because the proposed rules could
still be adopted by courts based on the same reasoning underlying the
proposed legislation. This Part reviews some of the specific proposals
embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the UCC, the Uni-
form Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), legislation pro-
posed by the New Jersey Law Revision Commission, and a selection of
international approaches. What emerges from the review of these pro-
posals is the possibility of a knowing assent analysis.
A. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Although the Restatement is not a statute, it represents an effort to
frame rules of law in language that resembles statutes. Accordingly, its
approach to the standard form contract term assent issue is worth exam-
ining. The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognized
264the importance of standard form contracts in the modem economy.
However, they also understood that assent in the context of standard
form contract terms should be analyzed differently than it is analyzed in
the context of a negotiated contract.265 In the comments to section 211,
263. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV.C.
264. For a more in depth discussion of the position taken by the Restatement (Second), see
John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1982). For the argument that courts should be applying the test
from the Restatement, see Wayne R. Barnes, Toward A Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Stan-
dard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV 227, 265
(2007). Comment (a) to § 211 provides the following:
a. Utility of standardization. Standardization of agreements serves many of the same
functions as standardization of goods and services; both are essential to a system of mass
production and distribution. Scarce and costly time and skill can be devoted to a class of
transactions rather than to details of individual transactions. Legal rules which would ap-
ply in the absence of agreement can be shaped to fit the particular type of transaction, and
extra copies of the form can be used for purposes such as record-keeping, coordination
and supervision. Forms can be tailored to office routines, the training of personnel, and
the requirements of mechanical equipment. Sales personnel and customers are freed
from attention to numberless variations and can focus on meaningful choice among a lim-
ited number of significant features: transaction-type, style, quantity, price, or the like.
Operations are simplified and costs reduced, to the advantage of all concerned.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (198 1).
265. Comment (f) to § 211 provides the following:
f Terms excluded. Subsection (3) applies to standardized agreements the general princi-
ples stated in §§ 20 and 201. Although customers typically adhere to standardized agree-
ments and are bound by them without even appearing to know the standard terms in
[Vol. 31:469
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the authors seem first to adopt Llewellyn's notion of "blanket assent., 266
They then describe some of the means by which "unfair terms" in stan-
dard form contracts can be policed. 67  Based on these premises, the au
thors adopted the following approach to standardized agreements:
§ 211 Standardized Agreements (1) Except as stated in Subsection
(3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise manifests
assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings
are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type,
he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to
the terms included in the writing. (2) Such a writing is interpreted
wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly
situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding
detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable
expectation. A debtor who delivers a check to his creditor with the amount blank does
not authorize the insertion of an infinite figure. Similarly, a party who adheres to the
other party's standard terms does not assent to a term if the other party has reason to be-
lieve that the adhering party would not have accepted the agreement if he had known that
the agreement contained the particular term. Such a belief or assumption may be shown
by the prior negotiations or inferred from the circumstances. Reason to believe may be
inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscer-
ates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the
dominant purpose of the transaction.
Id. cmt. f.
266. Comment (b) to § 211 provides the following:
b. Assent to unknown terms. A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of
agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the
standard terms. One of the purposes of standardization is to eliminate bargaining over
details of individual transactions, and that purpose would not be served if a substantial
number of customers retained counsel and reviewed the standard terms. Employees regu-
larly using a form often have only a limited understanding of its terms and limited author-
ity to vary them. Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the stan-
dard terms ....
Id. cmt. b.
267. Section (c) provides the following:
c. Review of unfair terms. Standardized agreements are commonly prepared by one
party. The customer assents to a few terms, typically inserted in blanks on the printed
form, and gives blanket assent to the type of transaction embodied in the standard form.
He is commonly not represented in the drafting, and the draftsman may be tempted to
overdraw in the interest of his employer. The obvious danger of overreaching has re-
sulted in government regulation of insurance policies, bills of lading, retail installment
sales, small loans, and other particular types of contracts. Regulation sometimes includes
administrative review of standard terms, or even prescription of terms. Apart from such
regulation, standard terms imposed by one party are enforced. But standard terms may be
superseded by separately negotiated or added terms (§ 203), they are construed against
the draftsman (§ 206), and they are subject to the overriding obligation of good faith (§
205) and to the power of the court to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or term
(§ 208). Moreover, various contracts and terms are against public policy and unenforce-
able. See Chapter 8.
Id. cmt c.
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of the standard terms of the writing. (3) Where the other party
has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a
particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.
Subsections 2 and 3 discuss whether a party assented to particular
terms and embodies a variation of the "reasonable expectations" ap-
proach described by Keeton.269  The Restatement also seems to reflect
Meyerson's position that analyzing assent objectively will determine
whether specific contract terms become part of the contract.27 ° Specifi-
cally, section 211 provides that standard form terms will only be deemed
assented to if all similarly situated people (1) reasonably would have ex-
pected such a term to be included in that contract and (2) would have
understood that the document was contractual in nature.271
Although Restatement section 211 adopts a specific approach to
analysis of standard form contract terms, that approach has not been
widely followed by the courts except in cases involving insurance con-
272tracts. In 1997, Professor James J. White conducted a search of cases
citing section 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.273 He
discovered 43 cases that interpreted section 211(3) in the United States,
274and over half of those were from Arizona.  Most of the Arizona cases
involved contracts that governed tort liability-namely coverage disputes
between insurers and their insureds.275 This author found more cases
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). The Comments to § 211 suggest
that it would apply not only to an analysis of assent to particular contract terms, but also to an analy-
sis of 'assent' when a party does not even understand that a document embodies contractual under-
takings. They cite, by way of example, baggage checks and parking lot tickets, which a party might
not recognize as contractual in nature. The assent issues raised by these types of fact patterns are
beyond the scope of this Article. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) cmt. d
(1981).
269. This approach has been adopted by some states, usually in connection with insurance
contracts. See discussion supra Part III.F.
270. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
272. In a very recent article, Professor Wayne R. Barnes agrees with my conclusions regarding
the extent to which the Restatement Section 211 has influenced court decisions. He argues that this
overlooked doctrine offers a good solution to the problems I propose to address with the doctrine of
knowing assent. See Barnes, supra note 264, at 250.
273. James J. White, Form Contracts under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 324-25
(1997).
274. White states that he conducted LEXIS and Westlaw database searches using the following
query: ((RESTATEMENT OR "REST") + I (SECOND OR "2d") +2 CONTRACT!) AND
((RESTATEMENT OR "REST")/6 "211". He also checked appendices to RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS to check the list for completeness.
275. White, supra note 273, at 325.
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citing § 211(3) after updating that research, but the majority continue to
276be insurance cases.
Thus, even though Restatement section 211 adopts a specific ap-
proach to analysis of standard form contract terms, that approach has not
277been widely followed except in cases involving insurance contracts.
B. The Uniform Commercial Code
The current version of UCC Article 2278 does not have a specific
provision to address the issue of assent to unbargained-for terms in stan-
dard form contracts. However, a provision was proposed during the Ar-
ticle 2 revision process that incorporates a version of the "reasonable ex-
pectations.,, 279 The 1997 Annual Meeting draft provided:
(a) In a consumer contract, if a consumer agrees to a record, any
non-negotiated term that a reasonable consumer in a transaction
of this type would not reasonably expect to be in the record is
excluded from the contract, unless the consumer had knowledge
of the term before agreeing to the record.
(b) Before deciding whether to exclude a term under subsection
(a), the court, on motion of a party or its own motion, shall af-
ford the parties a reasonable and expeditious opportunity to pre-
sent evidence on whether the term should be included or ex-
cluded from the contract, shall decide whether the contract
should be interpreted to exclude the term.
(c) This section shall not operate to exclude an otherwise en-
forceable term disclaiming or modifying an implied warranty.
2 80
276. I could not produce any results using White's query. Instead, I used the LEXIS feature to
search for cases citing Restatement of Law, Contracts, § 211, and found 114 cases. These articles
were found using the LEXIS Restatement--case citations-database, terms and connectors query
"Restatement w/6 211." Twenty-six of them were decided in Arizona, and three were decided after
1993. Thirty-six were decided after 1993. In addition, I reviewed all cases cited in the annotations
to the Restatement of Contracts (Second) from July 2006 through August 2006. I found a total of 25
cases cited. In most of these cases, the Restatement was cited by one of the parties to the litigation,
rather than cited as authority by the court deciding the case.
277. Barnes, supra note 264.
278. Despite Herculean efforts to revise Article 2, as of this date the current version of UCC
Article 2 is the unamended pre-2003 version of Article 2. Except as otherwise noted, all references
in this article to Article 2 are to that version. As discussed in the body of this Article, to date no state
has adopted the post-2003 version of Article 2 and its adoption appears to be unlikely.
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Two things are particularly noteworthy about this proposal. First, it
did not apply to all standard form contracts; it was limited in scope to
consumer contracts. 28' Second, one observer described the debate over
this proposed provision as one of the most-contested of all of the revised
282Article 2 provisions.
This proposal essentially took the same approach as the Restate-
ment by applying a form of the "reasonable expectations" test that elimi-
nates unbargained-for terms in standard form contracts.283 The proposal
was ultimately removed from the final approved version of revised Arti-
cle 2.284 The proposals regarding standard form consumer contracts were
285 m honly some of the controversial Article 2 revisions. By the time the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws accepted a uniform version, support for the re-
vised version was quite weak. 86 Accordingly, no state enacted the Arti-
cle 2 revisions into law.
287
C. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
The UCITA is another uniform law that attempts to address the
specific issue of assent to particular contract terms in the context of
online sales and licensing of computer information.288 The UCITA
281. In that same draft of Revised Article 2, a "consumer contract" was defined as "a contract
for sale between a seller regularly engaged in the business of selling and a consumer." Id. § 2-
102(8). "Consumer" was defined as the following:
[A]n individual who buys or contracts to buy goods that, at the time of contracting, are
intended by the individual to be used primarily for personal, family, or household use.
The term does not include an individual who buys or contracts to buy goods that, at the
time of contracting, are intended by the individual to be used primarily for professional or
commercial purposes.
Id. § 2-102(8)).
282. For a detailed discussion of the treatment of form contracts under the proposed revisions,
see James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315 (1997). For
discussions of some of the problems with revised Article 2, see Jean Braucher, Amended Article 2
and the Decision to Trust the Courts: The Case Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms,
Especially for Software, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 753 (2004); Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective
of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending Saga of A Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683, 1690
(1990).
283. U.C.C. Revised Article 2, § 2-206 (1997 NCCUSL Annual Meeting Draft), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucc2/ucc2797.htm.
284. See U.C.C. § 2-206 (2003).
285. Rusch, supra note 282.
286. Even the ABA UCC Committee had difficulty deciding to support its enactment. Finding
support sufficient to move state legislatures proved to be impossible.
287. Posting of Keith A. Rowley, krowley@law.ua.edu, to ucclaw-l@lists.washlaw.edu (Feb.
25, 2008) (on file with author) (providing updates on the status of Articles 1, 2, and 2A).
288. This abbreviated discussion of UCITA's provisions is included only to illustrate one pos-
sible legislative solution. Originally intended as a new Article 2B to supplement Articles 2 and 2A
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requires that parties assent to particular terms, and it defines manifesta-
tion of assent as having two key components: (1) a party's opportunity to
review the term, and (2) a party's affirmative action that a reasonable
person would understand as assent. Specifically, section 112 provides:
SECTION 112. MANIFESTING ASSENT; OPPORTUNITY TO
REVIEW.
(a) A person manifests assent to a record or term if the person, act-
ing with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review the
record or term or a copy of it:
(1) authenticates the record or term with intent to adopt or
accept it; or
(2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements
with reason to know that the other party or its electronic
agent may infer from the conduct or statement that the per-
son assents to the record or term.
289
The history of UCITA is almost as painful as that of the revisions to
Article 2.290 Originally intended to be Article 2B of the UCC, it faced
such strong opposition that supporters were forced to have it promul-
gated as a stand-alone uniform law.29' It is not surprising that as of this
writing, only two states have enacted the UCITA and further adoptions
are unlikely.292 The lack of acceptance of the UCITA can be explained
by the strong opposition of numerous powerful special interest groups.
Some of the hotly contested provisions included those that govern
of the UCC but later proposed as an independent code, UCITA has been adopted by two only states:
Maryland and Virginia. See MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW §§ 22-101 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§
59.1-501.1 (2008). The prospects of additional states adopting it are slim.
289. UCITA § 112 cmt. 8 (1999); Id. § 112(e)(1); see also id. § 21 l(l)(b); UCITA § 112(e)(l)
(rev. ed. Aug. 23, 2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita200.htm.
290. Compare Margaret Jane Radin, Humans Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND.
L.J. 1125, 1141 (2000) (arguing that "UCITA's definition of manifestation of assent stretches the
ordinary concept of consent"), with Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1145, 1187 (2000) ("There are no new legal developments [in UCITA's assent provisions]. The
revolution-if any-occurred with [Karl] Llewellyn's old Article 2, which abandoned most formal-
isms of contract formation, and sought a contract wherever it could be found."). Nonetheless,
UCITA's notice and assent provisions seem to be consistent with well-established principles govern-
ing contract formation and enforcement. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 35 ("we contend that
UCITA maintains the contextual, balanced approach to standard terms that can be found in the paper
world").
291. Radin, supra note 290, at 1140.
292. Id.
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disputes over standard form contract terms.293 Although widely con-
tested, the UCITA serves as an example to litigants and courts of a mean-
ingful way to analyze standard form contract term enforceability in that it
requires disclosure of the existence of those terms, and knowing assent to
particular terms.
D. New Jersey
At least one state, New Jersey, proposed legislation to meet the
challenge of analyzing standard form contracts.294 The history and scope
of that proposed legislation, The Standard Form Contract Act, is dis-
cussed at length in an article by John J.A. Burke, formerly Associate
Counsel of the New Jersey Law Revision Commission.2 95 Notwithstand-
ing the New Jersey Law Revision Commission's extensive study of the
issue, the statute was never enacted.296
The Act would have replaced all judicial devices used to evaluate
the enforceability of standard form contract terms with special rules to
297regulate, and in some cases forbid, particular types of contract clauses.
The types of clauses specifically covered by the Act were: (1) arbitration;
(2) risk of loss; (3) disclaimers of warranties; (4) payment of seller's at-
torneys fees; (5) unilateral change of contract terms; (6) choice of forum
and choice of law; and (7) remedy limitations.298 In addition, the Act
created a default rule to govern the analysis of what it defined as "secon-
dary terms., 299 The rule was that such terms would become part of the
contract unless a hypothetical reasonable person, who knew of the term
prior to making a purchase, would have walked away from the sale.3 °0
The critical distinction between the Act's default rule and tradi-
tional tests, such as unconscionability, is that the Act's rule focuses on
rejection of the entire deal, while the traditional tests focus on the rejec-
tion of the disputed term.30 1
293. A significant amount of historical material regarding UCITA and opposition to it can be
found at http://www.badsoftware.com. Additional information is available at http://www.ucita.com.
294. N.J. LAW REVISION COMM'N, NEW JERSEY STANDARD FORM CONTRACT ACT (1998),
available at http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/rpts/contract.pdf
295. Burke, supra note 174.
296. E-mail from John J.A. Burke, Professor, Riga Graduate School, to Edith R. Warkentine,
Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law (Nov. 2006) (on file with author).
297. Burke, supra note 174, at 312.
298. Id. at 314-15.
299. Id. at 315.





Countries outside the United States have formulated specific tests
for the enforceability of terms in standard form contracts.30 2 In general,
they distinguish between consumer standard form contracts and other
standard form contracts.30 3 The applicable law provides for enforcement
of only those terms in a standard form contract which a consumer might
have reasonably expected. For example, the Unidroit Principles of Inter-
national Commercial Contracts, which governs contracting under stan-
dard terms and when those terms will be enforceable, reads:
(1) No term contained in standard terms which is of such a char-
acter that the other party could not reasonably have expected it,
is effective unless it has been expressly accepted by that party.
(2) In determining whether a term is of such a character regard
shall be had to its content, language and presentation.
30 4
Other laws go even further to provide that unfair contract terms (terms
that are not negotiated) are not enforceable.30 5 Scholars who have stud-
ied these international solutions uniformly suggest that the United States
would benefit from taking a similar approach.30 6
F. Lessons Learned From Legislative Proposals
The legislative proposals reviewed in this Section share many
common features. Most focus on assent, which is defined in a variety of
ways. 307  The alternate approaches included a "blanket assent" ap-
302. This Part is largely based on the work of Professor Jennifer Martin. See Jennifer S. Mar-
tin, An Emerging Worldwide Standard for Protection of Consumers in the Sale of Goods: Did We
Miss an Opportunity With Revised Article 2?, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 223, 240 (2006) (summarizing laws
providing consumer protection in the sale of goods in the European Union, Eastern Europe, the
Pacific Rim and North and South America).
303. Id. at 229. As discussed above, in my opinion the better view recognizes that standard
form contracts all raise the same problems whether or not they involve consumers.
304. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, art. 2.1.20
(1994), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf.
305. Martin, supra note 302, at 240.
306. See, e.g., id.; Brooke Overby, An Institutional Analysis of Consumer Law, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1219 (2001) (comparing and contrasting U.S. and E.U. consumer law); Lawrence
Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative Analysis of Consumer
Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 14 n.40 (2002); Eric Mills Holmes & Dagmar Thurmann, A
New and Old Theory for Adjudicating Standardized Contracts, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 323
(1987).
307. See, e.g., supra note 290 and accompanying text (defining assent as requiring an opportu-
nity to review terms); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981); supra note 268 and
accompanying text (where assent to a particular term is not found if the form drafter has reason to
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proach,30 8 a "reasonable expectations" approach, 30 9 and an unconscion-
ability approach.310  Most of the proposals disaggregate consent to a
binding contract from assent to individual terms, 311 and each offers a
somewhat different approach to analyzing assent.
The legislative and quasi-legislative proposals, like the scholarly
literature, recognize that standard form contracts raise the issue of assent
to individual terms, an issue which must be disaggregated from the issue
of overall assent to be bound to a contract.312 Most of the proposals do
not question the possibility that a contract has been formed.313 Instead,
the legislation focuses on whether all of the terms represented by the
standard form contract provisions should be enforced. Furthermore, fail-
ure to enforce a contract term under most of these legislative proposals is
the exception rather than the rule.314 The only major new idea introduced
in these legislative proposals is that assent should be tied to disclosure or
at least tied to availability of terms,315 and, in some cases, an affirmative
showing of assent to terms rather than just assent to be in a contractual
relationship.316
V. WHAT IS WRONG WITH STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS,
AND WHAT ARE COURTS DOING ABOUT IT?
With all the attention that has been paid to standard form contracts,
what is missing is a forthright explanation of what is wrong with them.
Courts and commentators alike agree that we can no longer do business
without using standard form contracts.31 7 Standard form contracts seem
believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew the writing contained a
particular term).
308. This is the existing approach of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C.
art. 2 (2005); but see infra note 310.
309. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981); supra note 268 and
accompanying text; see also; U.C.C. art. 2 (2005).
310. The current version of Article 2 embodies this approach, by including § 2-302. Official
Comment 1 states: "This section is intended to make it possible for courts to police explicitly against
the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable." U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003).
311. See, e.g., supra note 290 and accompanying text.
312. Id.
313. As discussed in the body of this paper, none of the legislative proposals discussed in this
part suggest that a contract may not be formed; rather, each focuses on the enforceability of particu-
lar contract terms.
314. As discussed above, each of the proposals discussed lays out an approach to examining
the enforceability of particular terms-the bulk of the standard form contract terms would not be
affected. This is particularly the case under the "reasonable expectations" approach.
315. See, e.g., UCITA, supra note 289 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., supra note 294.
317. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski supra note 35, at 464.
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to be accepted as the status quo. The law and economics folks think that
standard forms are more efficient.3 8 Businesspeople like the conven-
ience of being able to use the same form repeatedly: their salespeople can
become familiar with the form; legal has blessed it; it is fast and it is pre-
dictable.3 9 The adhering parties encounter such forms in isolated trans-
actions and are more interested in the commodity or service they are pur-
chasing than the form they are being asked to sign. They may shop for
the price of the goods or the color of the car, but they will almost never
think about the form contract they are required to sign. Lawyers, law
students, and even law professors are quick to acknowledge that they
themselves rarely read the forms they sign or the agreements they "click
through" on the Internet.32°
When people began to form contracts in cyberspace, courts and
scholars paid close attention and described the "new" issues and "new"
concerns raised by such contracts. 321 However, there is nothing new to
cyberspace contracts when we look at the issues that are raised and the
cases that are litigated.322 The problems are the same as they have been
since the advent of standard form contracts. The challenges are with par-
ticular provisions tucked away in the standard form contracts for the
convenience and benefit of the form drafter. The cyberspace contract
cases are of particular interest, however, because in at least some in-
stances courts have made decisions regarding term enforceability using
an assent analysis.
Whether a particular clause is contained within an employment con-
tract, an insurance contract, a credit card agreement, an agreement with a
financial institution, a seller's standard form sales agreement or an Inter-
net provider's agreement, or any of the other commonly used form con-
tracts, the chief problem with the standard form contract is that the form
drafter "hides" selected onerous terms in it.323 Sometimes the terms are
318. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 66-67 (2d ed. 1977) (stating
that efficient economic planning is fostered by legal enforcement of private agreements); Nw. Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990) ("form contracts ... enable enormous sav-
ings in transaction costs").
319. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 35 at 488.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. But see id. (asserting that Internet contracting raises new problems, but concluding that
traditional contract doctrine is sufficient to address those problems).
323. See, e.g., Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1275 (9th Cir. 2006) (arbitration
clause "hidden" on page twenty-five of a thirty-page agreement); Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins &
Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (offeree is not bound by inconspicuous al-
legedly contractual provisions of which he is unaware and which are contained in a document whose
contractual nature is not obvious).
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"hidden" by means of their location in pages of small print.324  These
terms are discovered by the adhering party only some time after entering
into the contract, when a problem arises and the adhering party learns
that there is a totally unexpected and un-bargained for clause that alters
the rights that party expected under the contract.
325
In addition to the problem of "hidden terms," it is common for
terms in standard form contracts to favor the drafter. Some of the most
egregious provisions found in early standard form contracts have been
abolished through litigation or legislation. For example, the use of the
infamous "dragnet" clause 326 that resulted in the forefather of almost all
modern unconscionability cases, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 327 has been outlawed for use in consumer transactions in subsequent
revisions of UCC Article 9.328 However, other provisions persistently
appear in standard form contracts and are contested in the courts. A re-
view of case law suggests that certain clauses have resulted in the bulk of
the reported opinions. These include (1) arbitration clauses; 329 (2) choice
of law and forum selection clauses; 330 (3) clauses limiting liability (dis-
claimers of warranties, exclusion of liability for damages, remedy limita-
tions);331 (4) exculpatory and indemnification clauses; 332 and (5) clauses
reserving the right to make unilateral changes to contract terms. 333 These
324. See, e.g., Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1275 (arbitration clause "hidden" on page twenty-five of
a thirty-page agreement).
325. This Article does not address the issue of terms that are "hidden" because they are incor-
porated into documents that most people would not expect to contain binding contract terms, such as
ticket stubs and receipts.
326. For example, a clause stating that a security agreement secures all the debts that the debtor
may at any time owe to the creditor.
327. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In that case,
Mrs. Williams bought a variety of goods on secured credit. Under a dragnet clause in the store's
agreement, each new purchase became security for the repayment of the entire debt. Payments were
applied pro rata to the debt arising out of each individual sale. As a result, no purchase was ever
paid in full. When Mrs. Williams ultimately defaulted, the store repossessed everything she had
purchased, even though she had paid an amount that, had it been applied to pay off each debt as that
amount was reached, would have paid off the majority of her debt, leaving only a few items as secu-
rity for the remaining outstanding balance. Id.
328. U.C.C. § 9-204(b) (2005).
329. See cases discussed infra Part V.A.
330. See cases discussed infra Part V.B.
331. See cases discussed infra Part V.C.
332. See, e.g., Krueger Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Dist. Telegraph Co. of Pa., 247 F.3d 61 (3d Cir.
2001) (indemnification clause in fire alarm contract not unconscionable); Maxon Corp. v. Tyler Pipe
Indus., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 570, 577-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (the insertion of an indemnification clause
not agreed to by parties amounted to procedural unconscionability where the clause appeared in one
sentence at the end of a long passage in boilerplate).
333. See, e.g., Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(under Virginia law, clause not binding on customer where change-in-terms provision in customer
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are essentially the same clauses that the New Jersey Law Review Com-
mission identified in its 1998 study.334 The following discussion looks at
some of the standard form contract clauses that are consistently chal-
lenged, asks what is wrong with them, explores how courts are address-
ing the common challenges, and considers how a 'knowing assent'
analysis might lead to a different result. This Part also looks closely at
the enforcement of merger clauses, a type of clause that has not resulted
in an abundance of reported cases, but that can be challenged for lack of
"knowing assent."
A. Agreements to Arbitrate
Arbitration clauses may be the subject of more disputes over stan-
dard form contract terms than any other type of clause. 335 Binding arbi-
tration clauses provide that disputes shall be resolved through arbitration
rather than litigation.3 36 The scope of such clauses, i.e., the definition of
the disputes that must be resolved by arbitration, might include all dis-
putes between the same parties, all disputes arising out of or related to
the agreement, or a narrower range of defined disputes. The abundance
of reported cases involving the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
standard form contracts is understandable given the context in which
such suits will arise. Generally, one contract party (usually the adhering
agreement executed by consumer and bank did not authorize bank to unilaterally add an arbitration
clause; court interpreted contract clause to avoid unconscionable result).
334. The New Jersey Law Revision Commission's proposed law would have specifically ad-
dressed clauses regarding the following: (1) arbitration; (2) risk of loss; (3) remedies for non-
conforming and defective products; (4) choice of forum; (5) damage limitations; (6) attorneys fees;
and (7) unilateral change of contract terms. N.J. LAW REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS 13 (1998), available at
http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/rpts/contract.pdf.
335. For a detailed discussion of problems with mandatory arbitration clauses, see Christopher
R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695 (2001). For an empirical study
of dispute resolution in consumer transactions, see Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volun-
teering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experi-
ence, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62-63 (2004). For a discussion of some of the procedural
issues raised by class action waivers in arbitration provisions, see Carole Buckner, Due Process in
Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185 (2006). Susan Randall states that a systematic examination
of reported cases involving claims of unconscionability show that in 2002 and 2003 litigants raised
issues of unconscionability in 235 cases and that the courts found contracts or clauses unenforceable
in 100 of those cases, or 42.5 percent. Of those 235 cases, 161 or 68.5 percent, involved arbitration
agreements. She also states that courts were much more likely to find arbitration agreements, as
opposed to other sorts of contracts, unconscionable. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbi-
tration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004).
336. If an arbitration clause is not mandatory, or if it does not provide that the results of the
arbitrator are binding, the clause may result in delay, which may discourage challengers from pursu-
ing litigation; but on its face, it does not deprive the adhering party of recourse to litigation. Accord-
ingly, only mandatory binding arbitration provisions present the problems discussed in the text.
Seattle University Law Review
party) files suit, and the other (usually the form drafter) seeks to have the
suit dismissed because the contract contains a provision that mandates
arbitration. In response, the party who filed suit claims that the clause
should not be enforced.
One problem with mandatory binding arbitration clauses is that
they deprive the adhering party of a judicial resolution of the dispute.
Form drafters can lessen the impact of state regulations and case law by
assuring that disputes will not be heard in a judicial forum. 337  Such
clauses are often combined with outright waivers of the right to pursue
class actions. There is a wealth of scholarship discussing whether man-
datory or binding arbitration provisions deprive parties of procedural due
process. 338 Many scholars have focused on the use of arbitration clauses
in particular categories, such as labor and employment,339 financial ser-
vices,340 franchise agreements,341 and the securities industry.342 Focusing
exclusively on what is wrong with such clauses from the perspective of
contract law, several scholars have emphasized the lack of meaningful
choice, the lack of assent, and the fact that consumers do not understand
the clauses.343 Yet court challenges to arbitration provisions have fo-
cused on the doctrine of unconscionability.344
337 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33, 76 (1997)
("The enforcement of adhesive arbitration clauses allows firms to lessen the regulatory impact of
statutory claims-in short, to deregulate themselves.").
338.See, e.g., Buckner, supra note 335.
339.See Jeffrey L. Fisher, State Action and the Enforcement of Compulsory Arbitration Agree-
ments Against Employment Discrimination Claims, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 289, 295-97
(2000); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 33, 76 (1997); Sarah Rudolph
Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agree-
ments Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Stephen J. Ware, Em-
ployment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996); William M. Howard,
Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?,
43 DRAKE L. REV. 255 (1994).
340. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 267 (1995).
341. See, e.g., Jean R. Stemlight, Protecting Franchisees from Abusive Arbitration Clauses, 20
FRANCHISE L.J. 45, 47 (2000).
342. Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1352 n.63 (1996). See also Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A
Success Story: What Does the Future Hold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (1996); IAN R.
MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT ch. 13 (1994 &
Supp. 1996); Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1613
(1995).
343. See Drahozal, supra note 335, providing the following:
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Analysis of the enforceability of arbitration clauses begins with the
Federal Arbitration Act, which specifically provides that arbitration
agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract...
,345 The statute expresses a liberal policy that favors enforcement of ar-
bitration agreements. 346  As a result of this federal mandate, cases in
which courts have upheld arbitration agreements are voluminous.347 The
general rule is that federal law favors enforcement of such agreements,
and state law may be used to resist enforcement only if the same state
law would invalidate any contract provision on the same basis. 348  Ac-
cordingly, traditional contract defenses such as fraud, duress, and uncon-
scionability may be used to invalidate arbitration agreements (whereas a
state law specifically invalidating arbitration agreements may not).
349
It is not surprising that courts have been willing to invalidate arbi-
tration clauses based on unconscionability because unconscionability is a
traditional contract defense and arbitration clauses are often found in
non-negotiable standard form contracts. California courts, in particular,
have not enforced arbitration clauses if (1) the clause was contained in a
The criticisms of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are many. First,
arbitration is 'mandatory': individuals have no choice but to agree to arbitrate or do with-
out the good or service altogether, and, once they have agreed to arbitrate, they cannot
decide to go to court when a dispute arises. . . .Second, arbitration is 'unfair': limited
discovery, lack of a jury trial or a right to appeal, repeat-player advantages in selecting
arbitrators, no class relief, and excessive fees unfairly disadvantage individuals bringing
claims.... Finally, arbitration clauses likewise can be 'unfair': clauses drafted by corpo-
rations provide for biased tribunals and distant locations for hearings, preclude recovery
of attorneys' fees and punitive damages, shorten time limits for filing.
Id.; Demaine & Hensler, supra note 335; Jean Stemlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the
U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the
World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002); Katherine Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); Michael D. Donovan & David A.
Searles, Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers: How to Combat Overreaching Arbitration
Clauses, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 269 (1998).
344. In some cases, arbitration clauses have also been invalidated on general public policy
grounds. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 683 (Cal.
2000).
345. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
346. Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681(1996).
347. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 335 (citing Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitution-
ality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 25-39 (1997) (criticizing
courts for being too willing to enforce agreements to arbitrate)).
348. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 684-85 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987)).
349. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,492 n.9 (1987); Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686.
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standard form; (2) evidence showed that the contract was a "contract of
adhesion"; 350 and (3) the arbitration clause failed to meet the test set forth
in a line of cases beginning with Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Services.351 The Armendariz court held that such an arbitra-
tion agreement is lawful if it meets minimal requirements, "including
neutrality of the arbitrator, the provision of adequate discovery, a written
decision that will permit a limited form of judicial review, and limita-
tions on the costs of arbitration.,
352
However, even arbitration clauses that meet the Armendariz stan-
dard can be defeated on unconscionability grounds. One consistently
successful attack based on substantive unconscionability is the failure of
the clause to require both parties to pursue arbitration under the same set
of circumstances.353 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took this ap-
proach in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor.354 In that case, the court
characterized California law as raising a rebuttable presumption that an
arbitration clause in an employment contract is substantively uncon-
scionable, and to overcome that presumption, the employer must demon-
strate that the effect of a contract to arbitrate is bilateral with respect to a
particular employee.355
Although challenges to arbitration clauses in paper contracts are
usually based on public policy or unconscionability, in the context of
arbitration provisions in contracts posted and formed over the Internet,
some courts avoid enforcing the provision by using an assent analysis
instead of an unconscionability analysis. 356 In Specht v. Netscape Com-
munications Corp., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that even
350. California courts define a contract of adhesion as a "standardized contract, which, im-
posed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only
the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it." See e.g., Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst,
Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (2001) ("A finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a finding
of procedural unconscionability."). These courts equate the finding of a contract of adhesion with
the finding of procedural unconscionability.
351. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000).
352. Id. at 90-91.
353. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2002) (arbi-
tration that required employee to arbitrate virtually all disputes without imposing same requirement
on employer unconscionable under Armendariz).
354. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003).
355. Id. (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 1670.5 (West 2008)). Similarly, in Montana, courts have
refused to enforce arbitration clauses that were not "bilateral." See, e.g., lwen v. U.S. W. Direct,
977 P.2d 989, 995 (Mont. 1999) (arbitration provision on standardized form used by telecommuni-
cations company to market yellow page advertising found unconscionable and oppressive because
the rights of the contracting parties were one-sided and unreasonably favorable to the drafter: adver-
tiser was bound to arbitrate all disputes, but telecommunications company was not required to arbi-
trate disputes arising out of unpaid accounts).
356. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
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though the plaintiffs had clicked "yes" to show agreement to the terms of
the license agreement before they downloaded the defendant's software,
they had not assented to an arbitration clause included in Netscape's on-
line software license agreement where they could have learned of the
existence of the clause only by scrolling down the webpage to a screen
located below the download button.357 It reasoned that "a reasonably
prudent Internet user in circumstances such as these would not have
known or learned of the existence of the license terms before responding
to defendants' invitation to download the free software, and that defen-
dants therefore did not provide reasonable notice of the license terms.
358
Consequently, "the plaintiffs' bare act of downloading the software
did not unambiguously manifest assent to the arbitration provision con-
tained in the license terms., 359 The court emphasized that the touchstone
of a contract is a party's manifestation of assent, whether by written or
spoken word or by conduct. 360 It reasoned that a consumer's "click" on a
download button does not communicate assent to contractual terms if the
offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the download
button would signify assent to those terms.361 The court also emphasized
an exception to the general "duty to read" rule for situations when the
writing does not appear to be a contract and the terms are not called to
the attention of the recipient, noting that in such cases, no contract is
formed with respect to the undisclosed term.362
Although the court in Specht did not use the phrase "knowing as-
sent," it plainly departed from the strict "objective manifestation of as-
sent" approach to finding assent when it put the burden on the form
drafter to show that the term was called to the attention of the adhering
party. This approach is similar to that suggested in the earlier drafts of
UCITA and revised Article 2.363
357. Id. (court applying California law).
358. Id. at 20.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 29 (citing Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 550 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999)); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (1981) ("The conduct of a party is not
effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has
reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.").
361. Id. at 30 (citing Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 350
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972)).
362. Id.
363. See supra Part IV.B-C.
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B. Choice of Law and Forum Selection Clauses
Choice of law and forum selection clauses determines what law
governs in the event of a dispute and where the dispute is to be litigated.
364 In standard form contracts, both the choice of law and choice of fo-
rum are selected for the convenience of the form drafter, and may have
no relationship to the residence of the adhering party or to where the
transaction takes place. By controlling the choice of law, the form
drafter can avoid substantive state law-both legislative and judicial-
that might favor the adhering party. Many commentators agree that
some states have a more consumer-friendly or a more business-friendly
body of law.365  Thus, by including a choice of law provision a form
drafter can control the outcome of potential litigation. By controlling the
choice of forum, the form drafter can also almost assure a default judg-
ment, since a location outside of the adhering party's residence366 will
usually make it prohibitively expensive for that party to pursue a dis-
367puted claim. In addition, the form drafter can greatly reduce the
amount of potential adverse litigation because of the prohibitive cost to
the adhering party of initiating litigation in a forum that is far from the
adhering party's residence.
Most judicial analyses of forum selection clauses begin with the de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute,368 where the Court enforced a forum selection clause contained
in a cruise line's passage ticket contract. The Shutes, residents of the
State of Washington, claimed that they were unaware of the clause at the
364. Some of the recent articles discussing the enforceability of forum selection clauses in-
clude William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration,
2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2006); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commit-
ment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125 (2000); William J. Woodward, Jr., "Sale " of Law and Forum and the Wid-
ening Gulf Between "Consumer" and "Nonconsumer" Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U. L.Q.
243 (1997); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700 (1992).
365. See, e.g., Richard B. Cappalli, Arbitration of Consumer Claims: The Sad Case of Two-
Time Victim Terry Johnson or Where Have You Gone Learned Hand?, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 366,
367 (2001) ("Backed by precedents like Johnson, sellers and lenders can avoid legislation protecting
consumers by the simple expedient of inserting arbitration clauses into their adhesive contracts.");
Melissa Briggs Hutchens, Commentary: At What Costs?: When Consumers Cannot Afford the Costs
ofArbitration in Alabama, 53 ALA. L. REV. 599, 610 n. 11 (2001) ("Other states have applied their
state contract law in a more consumer-friendly fashion to arbitration provisions in general ... .
366. Or the principal place of business of a closely held corporation.
367. Whereas the option of a small claims court hearing may make it worth the adhering
party's interest to pursue a dispute when that same party has to go to another state, the costs of travel
and lodging while going to court will usually inhibit that party from proceeding for a claim with a
relatively small monetary value.
368. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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time they purchased their tickets.369 Sometime after the Shutes paid for
their tickets, the tickets arrived in the mail; the challenged clause was
included in material they received after they had paid for the cruise.
370
The tickets stated on their face: "SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS OF
CONTRACT ON LAST PAGES IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ
CONTRACT-ON LAST PAGES 1, 2, 3. ' 371 Contract page 1 of each
ticket stated:
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PASSAGE CONTRACT
TICKET....
3. (a) The acceptance of this ticket by the person or persons named
hereon as passengers shall be deemed to be an acceptance and
agreement by each of them of all of the terms and conditions of this
Passage Contract Ticket....
8. It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all
disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with
or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before
a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of
the Courts of any other state or country." 372
The Court reasoned that because the Shutes had time after receipt of
their tickets to cancel the cruise if they did not like the forum selection
clause, their retention of the tickets constituted acceptance of all of the
terms, including the choice of law provisions.373 The Court ignored the
unlikelihood that average cruise-goers would read material received after
they paid for their tickets and once they confirmed that their tickets were
enclosed in the envelope.374 It further ignored basic contract doctrine,
which would treat the language of the terms and conditions as proposals




371. Id. at 587.
372. Id. at 587-88.
373. Id. at 595.
374. Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I begin my dissent by noting that only the most me-
ticulous passenger is likely to become aware of the forum-selection provision.").
375. Under traditional contract analysis, a contract was formed between Carnival Cruise and
the Shutes when the Shutes paid the fare to the agent who forwarded the payment to the cruise line's
headquarters. The tickets that were then sent to the Shutes contained terms that were not part of the
original agreement. Accordingly, they should have been analyzed as proposals for a contract modi-
fication, to which the Shutes did not manifest assent.
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In the dissenting opinion, Justices Stevens and Marshall challenged
the majority's conclusion that the clause should be enforced.376 They
noted that forum selection clauses in passenger tickets involve the inter-
section of two strands of traditional contract law that qualify the general
rule that courts will enforce the terms of a contract as written.377 The first
strand was the principle that courts "review with heightened scrutiny the
terms of contracts of adhesion, form contracts offered on a take-or-leave
basis by a party with stronger bargaining power to a party with weaker
power., 378 In this context, they noted that this clause appeared in the
eighth of the twenty-five numbered paragraphs ("hiding" important terms
in small print is often a significant factor in a finding of procedural un-
conscionability).379 The second strand was that contractual provisions
that seek to limit the place or court in which an action may be brought
are invalid as contrary to public policy.380 The majority's conclusions in
Shute were fatally flawed for the same reason that Judge Easterbrook's
decisions in ProCd and Hill v. Gateway were flawed: they permitted one
party to unilaterally add contract terms, without requiring the other con-
tract party's assent to what was essentially a contract modification. The
Shute decision has been frequently criticized for the Court's willingness
to hold the Shutes to contract terms that were not disclosed until after the
contract was formed.38' However, because Shute is mandatory precedent,
lower courts continue to uphold forum selection clauses, even in situa-
tions like Shute where assent is lacking.382
Similarly, discussions of choice of law provisions have not focused
on enforceability as a matter of contract law.38 3  Rather, these discus-
sions assume the enforceability of such provisions as a matter of contract
law and explore the enforceability of such provisions vis-d-vis a jurisdic-
tion's interests in applying its own laws and hearing disputes affecting its
own citizens. 384  Certainly, such concerns are important; however, as
376. Carnival, 499 U.S. at 605.
377. Id. at 600.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 597.
380. Id. at 598.
381. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49 (1995); Edward
A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the
Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423 (1992).
382. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Okemo Mountain, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 98, 103 (D. Conn., 1998)
(providing "the validity of a forum selection clause in an adhesion contract depends on whether the
existence of the clause was reasonably communicated to the plaintiff." (citing Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991))).




Professor William J. Woodward Jr. illustrated in his article regarding
such contract provisions, it may not be necessary to reach those concerns
if basic contract doctrine is properly applied.385
Both the majority and dissent in Shute and most of the cases follow-
ing Shute ignore the basic contract requirement of assent.3 86 Although
assent might have been found based on the "duty to read" concept, the
facts of that case would have been better analyzed like the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals analyzed the facts in Specht.387 A reasonable per-
son who purchases cruise tickets would not expect to find additional un-
bargained-for terms in the package of tickets that arrives after payment
has been made. Indeed, such purchasers could reasonably assume that
they had been told all of the contract terms before they paid for the
cruise--either in the brochure advertising the cruise or in paperwork
signed in connection with ordering the tickets. Accordingly, the adher-
ing party should not be bound to the new terms mailed with the tickets
because those terms were inconspicuous and contained in a document
whose contractual nature was not obvious. In short, a knowing assent
analysis, which would require disclosure and understanding of those ad-
ditional terms, would lead to a conclusion that the terms were unenforce-
able.
C. Clauses Disclaiming Warranties and Limiting Remedies
Warranty disclaimers take away a buyer's right to expect a certain
level of product performance. Remedy limitations deprive the buyer of
the legal remedies for breach that would otherwise be available. If such
provisions are part of a negotiated contract between parties with equal
bargaining power, they represent an agreed upon allocation of risk,
which is usually reflected in other aspects of the transaction, particularly
the price. In contrast, when such contract provisions are part of a stan-
dard form contract the adhering party may not be aware of the provi-
sions. Even if the adhering party is aware of them, the party often lacks
the knowledge necessary to understand the import of such provisions,
which may be drastically at odds with that party's reasonable expecta-
tions.
Disputes over the enforceability of warranty disclaimers and rem-
edy limitations in transactions for the sale of goods are governed by the
385. Id.
386. Id. at 2 ("What has been largely missing from the work thus far is a focus on a preceding
set of threshold questions: I) whether the parties' purported agreement to a choice-of-law or a
choice-of-forum clause ought, as a matter of contract law, to be enforceable ... .
387. See Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
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UCC. UCC section 2-316 governs the disclaimer of express warranties,
the implied warranty of merchantability, and implied warranties of fit-
ness for a particular purpose. 388 Section 2-719 governs remedy limita-
tions.389 Both of these sections specifically invite, at least in part, an un-
conscionability analysis.
1. Section 2-316(1)
The enforceability of an express warranty disclaimer most often de-
pends on the application of the parol evidence rule. 390 A dispute over the
enforceability of an express warranty usually arises in the context of an
alleged oral warranty made prior to, or contemporaneously with, the
signing of a written contract that purports to disclaim warranties. As a
practical matter, if the court excludes evidence of the oral warranty, the
warranty disclaimer is effective. If, on the other hand, the evidence is
admitted (and believed), the warranty disclaimer will be effective only if
it is possible to construe it as consistent with the alleged oral warranty,
which rarely is the case. Accordingly, it is section 2-202 of the UCC-
the UCC's version of the parol evidence rule-that is often most impor-
tant in determining whether the express warranty disclaimer will be ef-
fective. 391 A leading commentator has suggested, and the suggestion has
been repeated by many others, that even if a fully integrated writing con-
tains a merger clause, it may be possible to show either that there was no
assent to that term or that the term is unconscionable.392 However, cases
that have actually stricken a merger clause on unconscionability grounds
are few and far between.393 In rare cases, courts have permitted evidence
of an oral express warranty to negate the effectiveness of a written dis-
claimer, notwithstanding the fact that the contract contained a merger
388. The disclaimer of the warranty of title is infrequently the focus of reported cases and is
governed by U.C.C. § 2-312.
389. U.C.C. § 2-719 (2003).
390. See supra Part II.A.
391. See Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Secord Bros., Inc., 343 N.Y.S.2d 256, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1973) (Court refused to admit evidence of alleged oral warranties where contract contained warranty
disclaimer and merger clause that stated, in part that "there are no promises, terms, conditions, or
warranties other than those contained herein"); Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., Inc.,
Nos. 165-72C3-168-72C3, 1980 WL 98403 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 1980.) ("There is some question
whether language that complies with U.C.C. 2-316 could be unconscionable under 2-302 .... If
there is some conduct that could render a disclaimer of warranties ineffective in a commercial set-
ting, such conduct is not present in the case at bar.").
392. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-12, 103-08 (5th ed. 2000).
393. See supra Part V.D.
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clause.39 4 In such cases, the courts seem to emphasize the exact language
of section 2-316(1) and interpret it to mean that a written disclaimer will
defeat the policy favoring enforcement of express warranties. 395 For that
reason, these courts ignore the merger clause and admit evidence of the
396oral express warranty.
For example, in Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc. ,3 the Oregon Court
of Appeals considered whether a merger clause would bar evidence of an
express warranty.398 In Seibel, the plaintiffs were partners in a farming
operation who brought suit for breach of contract, breach of warranty,
and negligence; they sought consequential damages allegedly caused by
the failure of a pump, which they purchased from the defendant, to func-
tion properly. 399 The buyers alleged that the seller had made oral express
warranties regarding the pump; however, the seller disclaimed all war-
ranties except for a very limited warranty in small print on the reverse
side of the printed sales contract. 400  The form also included a provision
that limited the seller's liability for breach of that warranty to the cost of
401repair. In addition, the form contained a merger clause, which indi-
cated that the writing was intended to be a complete and exclusive ex-
pression of their agreement. The seller's defense relied upon these con-
tract provisions to defeat the buyers' claims.40 2
394. See, e.g., Carpetland USA v Payne, 536 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (Evidence of
prior oral warranty by seller showed parties had not intended the writing to be "fully integrated," so
warranty was admissible; the warranty disclaimer was inoperative).
395. See, e.g., id. at 309 (court emphasized Official Comment I to section 2-316, which states
that this section, "seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer
by denying effect to such language when inconsistent with language of express warranty . .
396. See, e.g., Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 641 P.2d 668 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
397. Id.
398. Id. at 670.
399. Id. at 699-70.
400. Id. at 670.
401. The court's description of the form and its contents is telling:
Here, the terms and conditions are printed on standard-size paper (8/2 X 11) and fill ap-
proximately three-quarters of the page. These terms cover numerous aspects of the con-
tractual relationship in addition to the disclaimers. The type is smaller than that used for
footnotes in this court's permanent reports and the lines are longer and more closely
spaced than in our footnotes. There is neither indentation nor extra spacing between
paragraphs. The print is generally difficult to read. The exculpatory provisions them-
selves are set out no differently than the other terms. Only the paragraph headings, e.g.,
"WARRANTY," stand out, but such a heading suggests the making of warranties, not
their exclusion. (citation omitted). In sum, there is nothing conspicuous about the dis-
claimers here.
Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 641 P.2d 668, 670 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
402. Id. at 670-71.
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The court held that the warranty disclaimers, remedy limitation, and
merger clause were all invalid because of the manner in which they were
set forth in the standard form contract.4 °3 It emphasized the UCC policy
of requiring that disclaimers be "conspicuous" (although that term does
not appear in section 2-316(1)) and also referred to the UCC's uncon-
scionability rule.404 Specifically, with respect to the issue of whether the
merger clause evidenced the parties' intent, the court stated that
"[b]ecause the merger clause is as inconspicuous as the disclaimers, it
provides little or no evidence of the parties' intentions, regardless of the
defendant's intentions.A0 5 The court noted, "[w]e think that a merger
clause which would deny effect to an express warranty must be con-
spicuous to prevent an even greater surprise.,
40 6
The majority of cases, however, exclude evidence of an express
warranty on the grounds that the merger clause evidences the intent of
the parties to make the written agreement a full integration. For example,
in Roland v. A I Basic Four, Inc.,407 a doctor sued a computer manufac-
turer, claiming that certain oral express warranties had been breached,
but the Florida court upheld a merger clause in the seller's standard form
408contract. Without discussing whether the buyer had assented to that
clause, the court noted that under similar circumstances, other courts had
held that such language disavows prior expressions of warranty as a mat-
ter of law. 40 9 The court emphasized the relatively short length of the con-
tract and the fact that the challenged provisions were called to the
buyer's attention by language set forth above the signature line.410 It is
possible that a knowing assent analysis would reach the same result.
When an enforced contract is written in a form reasonably calculated to
call the signer's attention to it, the situation is a far cry from enforcing a




407. No. 90-6169, 1992 WL 454480 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 1992).
408. That clause read, "11. Interpretation. This Agreement supersedes all prior communica-
tions and agreements between the parties relating to the subject matter of this Agreement and consti-
tutes the full understanding of the parties with respect thereto .... " Id.
409. Id. (citing Earman Oil, 625 F.2d 1291, 1298 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Florida law));
Jaskey Fin. & Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160, 163-64 (D.C. Pa. 1983); Applica-
tions, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129, 132-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Investors Premium
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 44-45 (D.C.S.C. 1974); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 343
N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
410. "[T]he contract itself is only a few pages long. On its back are provisions that severely
limit Molinet's rights; a caption above the signature line declares that those provisions are incorpo-
rated into the agreement." Molinet v. MAI Basic Four, Inc., No. 90-6169, 1992 WL 454480 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 19, 1992).
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contract that contains hidden and confusing terms, unless the contract is
written in language that a reasonable person would not understand.
However, the reported decision does not discuss the facts that would
need to be examined for a knowing assent analysis.4 1 Just as courts in-
terpret the language required to disclaim a warranty of title in sales con-
tracts, courts should also require that merger clause language make it
clear to the signer which rights they are losing. For example, a statement
in plain English that reads "you cannot rely on any statements made by
the salesperson unless they are repeated in this written agreement" in
bold print directly above the signature line should satisfy knowing assent
requirements. In contrast, a statement that reads "this agreement is a full
integration" would not meet the knowing assent test because there is no
reason to expect an ordinary person to understand the meaning of such a
phrase.
2. Section 2-316(2)
Section 2-316(2) contains specific requirements for disclaiming the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular pur-
pose.41 2 The purpose of these warranties is to protect buyers from sur-
prise.413 Accordingly, they emphasize the likelihood that a contracting
party will become aware of the disclaimers by describing the required
414appearance and language of disclaimer. Subsection 2 specifically re-
quires "conspicuous" disclaimers.415 Under the UCC, a term is con-
spicuous "when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it
is to operate ought to have noticed it.'
4 6
41 i. See generally id.
412. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) provides the following:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability
or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must
be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion
must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fit-
ness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "[t]here are no warranties which extend be-
yond the description on the face hereof."
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2003).
413. Id. cmt. 1.
414. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
415. Id.
416. Id. §1-201(10). The full text of §1-201(1) reads as follows:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against
whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-
NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is 'con-
spicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated
term is conspicuous. Whether a term or clause is 'conspicuous' or not is for decision by
the court.
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The "conspicuousness" requirement addresses part of the problem
that would be addressed by a knowing assent analysis. The knowing as-
sent analysis is designed to assure that an adhering party has a meaning-
ful opportunity to be aware of the existence of a particular contract term.
In addition, it requires that the term be written or explained in such a
manner as to make it possible for the adhering party to understand the
consequences of agreeing to such term. If a term is "conspicuous," as
defined by the UCC, it assures that the adhering party has a meaningful
opportunity to be aware of the existence of that term. In addition to the
"conspicuousness" requirement, section 2-316(2) also requires the use of
particular language that alerts an adhering party to the meaning of the
disclaimer.417 Hence, courts desiring to adopt a knowing assent analysis
could model their requirements and analysis after the statutory analysis
required by section 2-316(2).
3. Section 2-316(3)
An alternate means of disclaiming warranties that is described in
subsection 3 does not explicitly require that the disclaimer be conspicu-
ous, but many courts have read a conspicuousness requirement into that
subsection.418 Courts reach this result by tracing the legislative history of
section 2-316(3), which was once combined in one subsection with the
language of subsection (2). They note that it makes no sense to protect
buyers by requiring that language be conspicuous when words like "mer-
chantability" or "fitness" are used, and not to impose that same require-
ment on words like "as is.'' 19
Id. § 1-201(1).
417. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (providing the general test for disclaimers of implied warran-
ties). Section 2-316(2) provides the following:
[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the lan-
guage must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and
conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it
states, for example, that 'There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on
the face hereof.'
Id. § 2-316(2).
418. This view was supported by Professor William D. Hawkland, who stated, "[w]hile the
subsection does not explicitly so provide, it would seem that these phrases and expressions would
have to be stated conspicuously to become effective disclaimers." I WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, A
TRANSITIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 76-78 (Am. Law. Inst. 1964); see also
cases collected in Milton Roberts, Annotation, Unconscionability, Under UCC § 2-302 or § 2-
719(3), of Disclaimer of Warranties or Limitation or Exclusion of Damages in Contract Subject to
UCCArticle 2 (Sales), 38 A.L.R.4TH 25 (1985).
419. See, e.g., Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 268 A.2d 345, 352-53 (N.J.
Super. 1970). The Court stated the following:
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4. Unconscionability and Warranty Disclaimers
Courts have, from time to time, attacked warranty disclaimers on
the grounds of unconscionability because the UCC's unconscionability
provision, section 2-302, provides that a court may find that any contract
clause was unconscionable at the time it was made. Courts are divided
on the issue of whether a disclaimer that otherwise satisfies the require-
ments of section 2-316 can be unconscionable. 420  It is difficult to see
how an unconscionability analysis could prevail if a warranty disclaimer
complies with section 2-316 requirements. The fact that the UCC con-
templates a valid warranty disclaimer would make it difficult for a court
to find a warranty disclaimer substantively unconscionable. Further-
more, if a disclaimer satisfies the conspicuousness requirements, it will
similarly be difficult to show procedural unconscionability. Neverthe-
less, some courts have excised warranty disclaimers, emphasizing ex-
treme procedural unconscionability and the adhering party's inability to
negotiate the terms.42 '
It does not make sense to require conspicuous language when a warranty is disclaimed by
use of the words 'merchantability' or 'fitness' and not when a term like 'as is' is used to
accomplish the same result. It serves no intelligible design to protect buyers by con-
spicuous language when the term 'merchantability' is used, but to allow an effective dis-
claimer when the term 'as is' is buried in fine print. Nor does it make sense to require
conspicuous language to disclaim the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
and not impose a similar requirement to disclaim other implied warranties that arise by
course of dealing or usage of trade.
Id. See also Lumber Mut. Ins., Co. v. Clarklift of Detroit, Inc., 569 N.W.2d 681 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997); Osborne v. Genevie, 289 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); contra De Kalb Agre-
search, Inc. v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. Ala. 1974).
420. See, e.g., Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enter, Inc., 396
N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (warranty disclaimer held unconscionable where equipment,
when delivered, did not work at all, even though court acknowledged that the warranty disclaimer
"was accomplished by conspicuous and bold print and thus complied with the statute in that re-
spect"); Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics, Inc. v. AMC Renault Corp., 478 N.Y.S.2d 505
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984) (although disclaimer of warranties contained in car lease complied with re-
quirements of U.C.C. § 2-316(2), question remained as to whether disclaimer was unconscionable
under section 2-302); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal. App. 1982) (an
unconscionable disclaimer of warranty may be denied enforcement despite technical compliance
with the requirements of UCC § 2-316); Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir.
1985) (warranty disclaimers which comply with U.C.C. § 2-316 are limited by section 2-302, which
provides that any clause of a contract may be found unconscionable). Compare FMC Fin. Corp. v.
Murphree, 632 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980) (it is not clear that U.C.C. § 2-302 applies to a warranty
disclaimer which meets the requirements of section 2-316) with Reibold v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 859
F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding one could strictly construe the UCC to prevent the application
of unconscionability to disclaimers of warranties under section 2-316 because that section does not
explicitly refer to section 2-302).
421. See FMC Corp., 632 F.2d at 419-21.
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Based on the reported cases, it seems that only in exceptional cir-
cumstances will unconscionability be effective to invalidate warranty
disclaimers that otherwise satisfy the requirements of section 2-316. In
some cases, however, courts have imposed a standard that is more
closely tied to determining whether the parties assented to the contract
terms. Specifically, some states require a showing that terms were dis-
closed or negotiated. 2
5. Section 2-719
Like section 2-316 on warranty disclaimers, section 2-719 on rem-
edy limitations begins with the assumption that contractual limitations on
remedies are valid.423 Instead of requiring particular language, section 2-
719 created its own test for determining the validity of remedy limita-
tions.424 That test is whether the remedy limitation has "failed of its es-
sential purpose." The Official Comments and case law suggest that ask-
ing whether a remedy limitation has "failed of its essential purpose"
means asking whether, at the time of performance, the remedy limitation
has the effect of denying the aggrieved party any meaningful remedy. If
so, the limitation is to be ignored, and the aggrieved party is to have re-
course to all applicable UCC remedies. The Official Comment suggests
that a remedy limitation that fails of its essential purpose is unconscion-
able. Specifically, the Official Comment to section 2-719 emphasizes
that "any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions of
this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion. ' 425 This
reference to unconscionability appears to be concerned with the substan-
tive unconscionability of such a provision. If a litigant were to attack
such a clause based on unconscionability, rather than simply arguing that
the limitation failed of its essential purpose, in most jurisdictions it
would still be necessary to prove procedural unconscionability.
Section 2-719(3) goes even further and provides that the limitation
of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of con-
sumer goods is prima facie unconscionable. 6 It then states as a general
rule that "[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. 427 Many courts have referred
422. See discussion infra Part Vi.
423. See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2005).
424. Id. § 2-719(2).
425. Id. § 2-719 cmt. 1.




428to this rule as creating a presumption of validity in commercial cases.
Perhaps as a result of the distinction drawn in this subsection, most
courts that have considered the issue have not found such a remedy limi-
tation unconscionable unless the case involves personal injury arising out
of defective consumer goods.429
Except for invalidating remedy limitations that would limit conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods,
section 2-719 focuses on the effect of the challenged contract clause
when an adhering party suffers a loss and seeks a remedy for that lOSS.
43 0
Unlike section 2-316, which governs warranty disclaimers and deter-
mines the validity of those provisions at the formation stage, section 2-
719's only guidance for evaluating remedy limitations at the time of con-
tract formation is its requirement that unless the limitation is expressly'
made an "exclusive" remedy, the adhering party retains all rights and
remedies otherwise available under the UCC.
431
A knowing assent analysis would ensure that adhering parties pay
more attention to such contract provisions at the formation stage of the
agreement. Not only should remedy limitations be conspicuous, so that
an adhering party is aware that they are included in the agreement, but
they should also be written in language that clearly sets forth their legal
effect.4 32 How many people understand that a clause limiting a remedy to
"repair or replacement" means that there can be no suit for damages? A
requirement that the remedy limitation be conspicuous and that its legal
effect be explained would add little to the burden of the form drafter, but
the requirement would greatly enhance the chances that the adhering
party would understand the significance of such contract provisions.
D. Merger Clauses
A merger clause, also known as an "integration clause," is a con-
tractual provision designed to preclude the admissibility of parol evi-
dence.433 A parol evidence rule analysis relies on a determination of
428. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. HENNING & GEORGE I. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §11.43, 11-150 (Rev. ed. 2002) ("most authorities have read [§ 2-
719(3)] as establishing a presumption of conscionability").
429. For further discussion of remedy limitations and unconscionability, see Edward Samuels,
The Unconscionability of Excluding Consequential Damages Under the U.C.C. When No Other
Meaningful Remedy is Available, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 197 (1981).
430. See U.C.C. § 2-719.
431. Id.
432. Some courts have read a "conspicuousness" requirement into § 2-719. See, e.g., Avenell
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 324 N.E.2d 583, 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
433. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (8th ed. 2004).
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whether an agreement is fully integrated; that is, whether the parties in-
tended to state fully and conclusively all of the terms of their agreement
434in the subject written instrument. Historically, many courts treated a
merger clause as dispositive on the issue of integration.435 Other courts
took the view that such a clause creates only the presumption of integra-
tion.436 The two most common approaches in determining integration are
Professors Williston and Lord's "four comers" approach and Professor
Corbin's "all evidence" approach.437
Williston and Lord took the view that the question of integration
could be resolved by looking within the "four comers" of the writing.438
If the writing appeared to be full and complete, a court would have
deemed it fully integrated.439 It followed that if the parties included a
merger clause in their agreement, it was unnecessary to look outside of
the document because they had expressly stated their intent to fully em-
body their agreement in that writing.44 ° Unless there were obvious blanks
in the agreement or missing terms that would have been expected in such
a contract were missing, a four comers approach to integration analysis
readily leads to a conclusion that a writing is a complete integration.441
Corbin disagreed with Williston and Lord's view. Corbin believed
that integration is a question of the parties' intent to fully integrate their
agreement, which must be resolved only by reference to all available
evidence of that intent. Accordingly, Corbin argued that courts should
always hear extrinsic evidence on the issue of whether the parties had
assented to the writing as a complete integration.442 Nevertheless, even
Corbin apparently took the position that once the parties had agreed to
434. John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1342 (1975).
435. See, e.g., Telecom Int'l. Am. Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 189, 202 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (stating that under New Jersey law, "[w]here a writing purports to be complete on its face, the
writing must be accepted as the full expression of the agreement of the parties; parol evidence is not
allowed."). Accord UAW-GM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 579 N.W.2d 411, 413
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
436. See, e.g., Bock v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 257 F.3d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 2001) (providing
"[w]ritten contracts are presumptively complete in and of themselves; when merger clauses are
present, this presumption is even stronger").
437. 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:5 (4th ed.
2006); 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 581, 145 (Int. ed. 1979) ("it can never be
determined by mere interpretation of the words of a writing whether it is an 'integration' of anything
..... ). Accordingly, Corbin took the position that all extrinsic evidence should be considered to
determine whether the parties intended a complete integration.
438. 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 437, § 32:5.
439. Id. § 33:20.
440. Id. § 33:21.
441. Id. § 32:5.
442.3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 588 (1960).
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the document as their final contract, they were bound by a merger
clause.4 3
Professor Murray, in a careful examination of the parol evidence
rule, noted the difficulty of applying the parol evidence rule to standard
form contracts. 444 He recognized that the real problem with applying the
parol evidence rule to standard form contracts is the likelihood that the
adhering party has truly assented to all of the contract terms." 5
Even though there are volumes of cases raising parol evidence rule
issues, and even though UCC section 2-302 provides that any contract
provision can be challenged on unconscionability grounds, there are sur-
prisingly few reported cases discussing assent to or the unconscionability
of merger clauses in standard form contracts.446 The two most notable
decisions arose in connection with a determination of the validity of a
warranty disclaimer. 447 Nowhere is the choice between an unconscion-
ability analysis and an assent analysis better illustrated than in the case of
such clauses.
As discussed above in connection with warranty disclaimers, un-
bargained-for merger clauses in standard form contracts can effectively
deprive the adhering party of contract rights that would otherwise arise
from oral express warranties. Such a result is problematic because it en-
courages misleading and high-pressure sales tactics where salespeople
make inflated promises and buyers rely on those promises only to find
that the written contract document includes a merger clause excluding
evidence of oral warranties. Unless the unwary adhering party in the
standard form contract can prove fraud, duress, or other classic
443.3 Id. § 578.
444. Murray, supra note 434, at 1374-75.
445. Id. at 1389.
446. Westlaw and LEXIS database searches were both performed in 2008 using the terms and
connectors: "merger clause" w/s unconscionabl!. These searches yielded only 14 cases. Of these,
only a handful explained why a particular merger clause was or was not unconscionable. Even
fewer cases discuss assent to a merger clause as the basis for a decision regarding the enforceability
of the clause. Although a Westlaw database search using "merger clause" & assent % unconscion-
abl! resulted in 279 cases, the only cases that actually talked about assent were the handful discussed
in the body of this paper. The vast majority of the cases simply noted the presence of a merger
clause in passing, while emphasizing other issues. Kerry L. Macintosh similarly found only four
cases worth discussing in her article, When Are Merger Clauses Unconscionable?, 64 DENV. U. L.
REV. 529 (1988) (discussing Franz Chem. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F.2d 146 (5th Cir.
1979); Smith v. Cent. Soya, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.C. 1985); Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc.,
641 P.2d 668 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co., 581 P.2d 1352 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978)). As a theoretical matter, the commentators' suggestion that a merger clause may be
unconscionable is well founded. Macintosh, supra note 446, at 547.
447. See discussion supra Part V.C.
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'exceptions' to the bar of the parol evidence rule, a salesperson engaging
in such tactics will get away with his or her unfair conduct.448
Perhaps the most notable case, where the Oregon Court of Appeals
refused to enforce a merger clause, is Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc.449
As discussed above, the Seibel court analyzed the merger clause both on
the bases of assent and unconscionability.45 ° With respect to assent, the
court noted that applicable law 451 required that the parties intend for the
agreement to be their complete expression.452 It reasoned that because
the merger clause was inconspicuous, it provided little or no evidence of
the parties' intentions, regardless of the defendant's intentions.453 In ad-
dition, the Seibel court analyzed the merger clause under the UCC's un-
conscionability provision 454 and concluded that a merger clause that
would deny effect to an express warranty must be conspicuous to prevent
an even greater surprise.455
Another case in which a court refused to enforce a merger clause
was Sierra Diesel Injection Service, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., Inc.4 56 Si-
erra Diesel involved a family-owned-and-operated business which pur-
chased a posting machine from Burroughs Corporation. The buyers
signed a standard form contract that contained a merger clause; they later
sought to enforce an alleged express warranty in a letter sent before the
form contract was signed over the seller's objection that the contract was
fully integrated and excluded express warranties. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals observed that in determining whether several docu-
ments are integrated to form one contract, the presence of a merger
clause, while often taken as a strong sign of the parties' intent, is not
conclusive in all cases. The court agreed with the trial court and found
that the merger clause did not conclusively establish that the form con-
tract was fully integrated because the buyer was not sophisticated; the
448. When salespeople make misrepresentations to induce the adhering party to sign the con-
tract, courts split on the issue of whether the parol evidence rule bars such evidence of fraud in the
inducement. In some cases, the admissibility of the evidence will depend on the exact wording of
the merger clause. Of course, merger clauses and the parol evidence rule are used to exclude more
than just pre-writing express warranties. For example, another common problem area is written
employment agreements that do not call for notice of termination with a corresponding employee
allegation that the parties orally agreed that notice would be given.
449. Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 641 P.2d 668 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
450. See supra Part V.C.2.
451. OR. REV. STAT. § 72.2020 (2005).
452. Seibel, 641 P.2d at 671.
453. Id.
454. OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3020 (2005).
455. Seibel, 641 P.2d at 671.
456. Sierra Diesel Injection Serv. Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., Inc., 890 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1989).
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seller knew of the buyer's needs; the agreement consisted of at least four
separate writings; it was impossible to understand what basic transaction
was intended without some coordinating explanation; and the seller's
subsequent repair efforts showed that it intended to live up to the repre-
sentations it made in the letter.457
Some of the cases deal with assent to a merger clause in the context
of a UCC section 2-207 "battle of the forms." For example, in White
Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. McGill Manufacturing Co.,458 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals construed language in the buyer's purchase or-
der form as merger clause language. 459 The buyer had sent its form in
response to the seller's detailed price quotation; the court characterized
the quotation as an offer.4 60 The court found that the buyer's acceptance
was expressly conditional on the seller's assent to the additional terms,
which included a merger clause. 461 Because the seller did not "expressly
assent" to those additional terms, the merger clause did not become part
of the contract. Indeed, the court found that no contract was formed until
the parties began to perform, at which point contract formation occurred
under section 2-207(3), which also determined the terms of the con-
tract.
4 62
In Franz Chemical Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co.(PQ), 463 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of the parties' assent
to a merger clause in a conclusory manner. The parties in Franz entered
into a temporary, nonexclusive, nontransferable patent license agreement
under which Franz was licensed to buy, repackage, and resell a PQ prod-
uct. When the product failed, Franz sued for damages, and PQ defended
based on a remedy limitation clause. Although the court's opinion does
not set forth the facts in detail, it appears that Franz wanted to introduce
evidence of preliminary negotiations to show that other remedies should
be available; but the trial court excluded the evidence because the con-
tract included a merger clause that read in part: "[T]his agreement is exe-
cuted and delivered with the understanding that it embodies the entire
agreement between the parties and that there are no prior representations,
warranties, or agreements relating thereto."464 The court determined that
the clause made the intent of the parties clear that the terms of the
457. Id. at 113.
458. White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. McGill Mfg. Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 1185 (8th Cir. 1999).
459. Id. at 1191.
460. Id. at 1190.
461. Id. at 1191.
462. Id. at 1191-92.
463. Franz Chem. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1979).
464. Id. at 148.
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contract were complete and exclusive; thus UCC section 2-202(b) pro-
hibited the court's consideration of any additional consistent terms. It
also noted (without elaborating) that there was "no indication that the
merger clause should be deemed unconscionable under UCC section 2-
302. 46
Franz illustrates a typical approach to treating a merger clause as a
statement of the intent of the parties without exploring whether there was
actual knowing assent to that particular contract term. Under the UCC's
parol evidence rule, it would have been appropriate for a court to explore
evidence of the prior negotiations to see if both parties in fact intended
the writing to be the exclusive statement of the terms of their agree-
ment.466 If it could be demonstrated that Franz was relying on representa-
tions made during the negotiations, then the court should have examined
whether Franz was aware of the merger clause and its meaning.
467
A court analyzed a similar provision in Bakhico Co. Ltd. v. Shasta
Beverages,468 a case in which both parties, a buyer and seller, were en-
gaged in business and entered a contract for the purchase of 107,100
cases of canned soft drinks destined for Moscow, Russia.469 The docu-
mentation included a manufacturing agreement, which provided the fol-
lowing:
Entire Agreement. This Agreement, including the exhibits hereto,
constitutes the entire and only agreement between the parties per-
taining to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and con-
temporaneous agreements and understandings, oral or written, of
the parties in connection herewith. This Agreement shall not be
amended other than by a written instrument executed by all parties.
No agent of [Shasta] or [Bahico] is authorized to make any repre-
sentation, promise, or warranty not contained in this Agreement.
No interpretation or waiver of any of the provisions hereof shall be
binding upon any party unless in writing and signed by its author-
ized officer.
470
Based on that paragraph, the court precluded the admission of ex-
trinsic evidence, emphasizing that the parties were experienced in busi-
ness and that the contract was "fully negotiated and voluntarily
465. Id. at 149.
466. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (2005).
467. Because the reported case does not include enough facts, it is not clear that the parties
signed a standard form contract.
468. Bakhico Co. Ltd. v. Shasta Beverages, Inc., No. Civ.A.3:94-CV-1780-H, 1998 WL 25572
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 1998).
469. Id. at *3.
470. Id. at *19.
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signed."A7' The court did not address the specific issue of the uncon-
scionability of the merger clause, nor did the parties challenge it on those
grounds. 72
Likewise, in Patray v. Northwest Publishing,73 the plaintiff au-
thor filed suit against a publishing company, publisher, and operations
manager, alleging that the defendants engaged in fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, and deceit concerning the publication date and projected return on
plaintiff's book. 7" The court, while ruling on a variety of procedural
issues, noted that a merger clause will typically bar an action for fraud if
it purports to merge all prior representations (in this case, Van Treese's
underlying representation that Northwest would publish Patray's book by
December 1994 in exchange for Patray's money, manuscript, and entry
into the contract). 75
Yet another unconscionability and merger clause case was Agristor
Leasing v. Bertholf, which involved an appeal from a summary judgment
on the validity of a lease. 76  The court distinguished an early case
where the lessee had agreed to the terms of the written lease that con-
tained a merger clause. 4 78 The court found that the merger clause, which
stated that the lessee did not rely on any promises or conditions except
those in the written lease, was conspicuous, and it noted that each lessee
had signed his initials directly below the bold lettered provision.479 Not-
withstanding, the court found that the primary issue in the case was
whether the lessees were fraudulently misled into believing that reading
the lease was not necessary. 480 Even though the lease contained a merger
clause, there were facts to support a finding that the merger clause itself
was entered into under "duress, overreaching, undue influence, or
fraud.'' 48  There was also sufficient factual support to preclude summary
judgment on the issue of unconscionability.
48 2
471. Id.
472. There was, however, a challenge to the transaction as a whole for unconscionability.
473. 931 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
474. Id. at 868.
475. Id. at 872.
476. Agristor Leasing v. Bertholf, 753 F. Supp. 881 (D. Kan. 1990).
477. Agristor Leasing v. Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307, 1313 (D. Or. 1985).




482. Id. The court emphasized that the lessee did not read the lease, was not given any oppor-
tunity to read the lease, and relied on the lessor's representative to explain the terms of the lease.
Due to the inequality in bargaining power and the lessor's insistence that the lease could not change,
the court concluded that the lease was an adhesion contract. Id. It appears that the unconscionability
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A final example of a merger clause situation involved franchisor
and franchisee disputes, which more often reflect a customer's uneven
bargaining power than do other "business" transactions.483 Many fran-
chisees are unsophisticated, albeit engaged in business. Thus, one might
predict a decision more favorable to the adhering party in cases in which
a franchisee challenged a contract term in the franchise agreement.48 4
VI. WHEN COURTS HAVE USED AN ASSENT ANALYSIS
TO EXCISE STANDARD FORM CONTRACT TERMS
In the limited instances when courts have purposely looked for as-
sent to terms in standard form contracts, apart from consent to the con-
tract as a whole, courts have usually found that assent is lacking and re-
fused to enforce the terms. It is therefore useful to examine those limited
cases.
A. Cases Decided Under UCC Section 2-20 7
UCC section 2-207 requires a court to examine assent in two in-
stances: (1) where an acceptance is "expressly made conditional" upon
assent to additional or different terms under section 2-207(1) 485 or (2)
where a "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance" operates as
an acceptance under section 2-207(1), but the contract is between mer-
chants and the acceptance contains a "material alteration" under section
2-207(2).486
In the first group of cases, the UCC provides that no contract is
formed unless the original offeror "expressly assents" to the conditional
argument related to the lease and the lease transaction as a whole, rather than to the merger clause
itself.
483. See, e.g., Indep. Ass'n of Mailbox Ctr. Owners, Inc. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d
659, 668 (2005) (discussing enforceability of arbitration provisions in franchise agreements and
determining that "[t]here is a clear disparity in the bargaining power of franchisors versus franchi-
sees.").
484. Of course, if the franchisee were represented by counsel, the "procedural" aspect of un-
conscionability would be difficult to establish.
485. See, e.g., Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir.
1986) ("If a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance expressly conditions acceptance on the
offeror's assent to additional or different terms contained therein, the parties' differing forms do not
result in a contract unless the offeror assents to the additional terms.") (citing WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 238, §§ 1-2, at 32-33).
486. Under U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b), if both parties are merchants, additional terms automatically
become part of the contract unless "(b) they materially alter it." U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b), Such terms
do not become part of the contract absent explicit agreement by both parties. See, e.g., Matter of
Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Camac Textiles, 45 N.Y.2d 327, 408 (N.Y. 1978) (arbitration clause in a
confirmation constitutes a material alteration of an existing contract between merchants, which does
not become part of the contract without explicit agreement by the recipient of the invoice).
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acceptance.487 In almost every reported case in this group, courts con-
clude that there is no express assent when the original offeror fails to re-
spond to the conditional acceptance, but instead proceeds to ship the
goods involved.488 In those cases, most courts and commentators agree
that no contract is formed by virtue of the exchange of forms. Instead, a
contract is formed by conduct under section 2-207(3), 489 and the terms of
the contract are those on which the writings agree plus supplementary
terms incorporated under other provisions of Article 2.490 These cases
make it clear that silence in response to the conditional acceptances will
not constitute the necessary assent to the additional or different terms. 49 1
In the second group of cases, even when a court finds that a con-
tract was formed under section 2-207(1), additional terms are treated as
proposals for addition to the contract. Most of the cases in this category
involve situations in which the parties were either unaware that the addi-
tional terms were in the offeree's form or ignored that fact until a dispute
arose where the additional terms would apply if they were part of the
contract.
Whether additional terms are part of the contract depends on
whether the transaction is "between merchants.' 492 Unless both parties
are merchants, the additional terms are merely proposals for addition to
the contract and must be agreed to or they do not become part of the con-
tract.493 On the other hand, if both parties are merchants, terms that "ma-
terially alter" the terms of the offer are not incorporated into the contract
without express assent.494 In the majority of cases involving merchants,
courts have concluded that silence in response to an acceptance that con-
tains additional terms does not constitute assent to those additional
terms.495
487. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (2003).
488. See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Some authorities disagree, however, and would find that when the original offeror accepts
goods shipped after dispatch of an "expressly conditional" assent, that conduct constitutes the requi-
site assent to the terms. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 238, § 1-3; John E Murray, Jr., Section
2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 597 (1978).
492. See U.C.C. § 2-104 (2003) (defining "merchant" and "between merchants").
493. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2003).
494. There is not always uniformity regarding whether a particular term constitutes a material
alteration. For a discussion of this issue, see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 238, § 1.3, n.34.
495. See N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 726-27 (8th Cir. 1977) (pro-
viding that express assent under § 2-207(2) cannot be presumed by silence or mere failure to object);
Coastal Indus., Inc. v. Automatic Steam Prods. Corp., 654 F.2d 375, 379 (5th Cir.1981) (Mere re-
ceipt of the goods without comment does not meet the UCC's express acceptance requirement);
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Courts have split over whether section 2-207(2) applies to both
"different" and "additional" terms or only "additional" terms.496  The
majority of courts that have considered the issue adopted the "knock-out"
rule to govern the analysis of different terms.4 97 Specifically, these
courts find that if the offeror's form and the offeree's form have provi-
sions that address the same issue differently, there is no assent to either
term.'" Accordingly, they reason, although there is still a contract under
section 2-207(1), the different terms "drop out" of the contract. Any re-
maining gaps in the contract are filled by reference to supplementary
terms incorporated under other provisions of Article 2.
Finally, terms that do not materially alter the agreement are incor-
porated into the contract if (1) the offeror and offeree are both merchants,
(2) the offer does not limit acceptance to its terms, and (3) there has been
no notice of objection to terms. 500
When section 2-207 is applied to cases involving shrinkwrap,
clickware, and browseware contracts, courts reach these same results
50 1
except in cases where the court adopts the erroneous "rolling contract"
analysis. °2
B. Other Cases Imposing an Assent Requirement
The other instances in which courts have looked for specific assent
have been in jurisdictions where courts have determined for public policy
reasons that particular terms must be negotiated to be incorporated into a
contract.50 3 For example, under Washington law, warranty disclaimers
Schubtex, Inc. v. Allen Snyder, Inc., 399 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 1979) (providing repeated use of
forms on prior occasions does not constitute express assent).
496. See Richardson v. Union Carbide Indus. Gases, Inc., 790 A.2d 962, 968 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div., 2002).
497. Id.
498. Id. at 967.
499. Id. at 968. This approach is known as the "knock-out rule."
500. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2003).
501. See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (Addi-
tional or different terms contained in "written confirmation" located in package containing computer
and shipped after contract was formed by phone, did not become part of the contract because the
buyer did not expressly agree to them even though standard terms indicated that buyer's retention of
computer amounted to acceptance of its terms.).
502. See critique of the "rolling contract" analysis in Lawrence, supra note 233.
503. Although these courts have not necessarily couched their analyses in terms of assent, as
the textual discussion reveals, their approach reflects the building blocks of the knowing assent
analysis proposed in this article.
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must explicitly be negotiated and set forth with particularity. °4 In Berg,
a case decided under the Uniform Sales Act, the Washington Supreme
Court fashioned its own test for determining the validity of warranty dis-
claimers in consumer transactions. In Berg, the buyer of a new automo-
bile experienced a series of serious mechanical problems immediately
after the purchase. The buyer periodically returned the car to the seller
for repairs; the car was in the shop for repairs for twenty days during the
first four months after delivery, and problems still continued. 505 Eventu-
ally, the buyer sued for rescission of the purchase contract.5 °6 The seller
refused, relying in part on the buyer's signature on written contracts that
waived all warranties of fitness, express or implied, and acknowledged
that he was buying the automobile without any guarantee whatsoever.
50 7
The Washington Supreme Court carefully described the two con-
tracts signed by the buyer and the location of the warranty disclaimer in
each of the two contracts.50 8 For each contract, the court observed that
the disclaimer language was located in the midst of many other printed
provisions. In the purchase order, the disclaimer was on the reverse side
of the form where all of the "dickered" terms appeared.50 9 In the condi-
tional sale contract, the disclaimer language took up "1 of 26 lines of
mass-printed material" among five printed paragraphs which occupied
nearly one-half of the entire page. 510 The court rejected the notion that
these written provisions accurately represented the bargain assented to by
the buyer:
The purported disclaimers of warranty in the conditional sale con-
tract form and the waiver of warranty in the purchase order form
highlight the absurdity of a rule of law which elevates these bland
and substantially meaningless terms and conditions above the indi-
vidually and expressly negotiated terms and conditions, and gives
them controlling effect over specifically agreed upon items and
conditions of the contract. To adhere to such a rule means that the
504. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P2d 380 (1971). The "Berg rule" was followed
in, among other cases, Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers Inc., 86 Wash. App. 357, 936 P.2d 1191
(1997).
505. Id. at 383.
506. Id. at 380.
507. Id. at 381.
508. The buyer signed both the seller's form purchase order and conditional sale contract.
Each document stated that no warranties, express or implied, had been made by the seller. Id. at
383.
509. The court noted that "all items of contract sufficient to identify the car by name, kind,
style, size, power and all optional extra equipment on it were handwritten or hand printed in the
blank spaces of the order form." Id. at 383.
510. Id. at 385.
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law presumes that the buyer of a brand new automobile intends to
nullify in general all of the things for which he has specifically bar-
gained and will pay. We would presume the buyer does just the op-
posite.
5 11
The court emphasized that nothing in the record reflected that the
parties ever discussed, contemplated, or agreed that the buyer intended to
waive his bargained-for rights.512  It then fashioned the rule that has
come to be known as the Berg rule: waivers of [implied] warranties are
ineffectual unless explicitly negotiated between buyer and seller and set
forth with particularity showing the particular qualities and characteris-
tics of fitness which are being waived.51 3
The similarity of the Berg rule to the concept of knowing assent is
readily apparent. Like the proposed knowing assent analysis, the Berg
rule requires that disclaimers be set forth with particularity (paralleling
the knowing assent "conspicuousness" requirement). It also mandates
that waivers of implied warranties are ineffectual unless explicitly nego-
tiated between buyer and seller (paralleling the knowing assent require-
ments that (a) the importance of that term be explained so that the adher-
ing party understands its significance, and (b) the adhering party objec-
tively manifest its assent to that term separately from its assent to under-
taking a contractual obligation).514
After the court's decision in Berg, the Washington legislature
amended Washington's version of the UCC to require particularity in
consumer (non-commercial) transactions.515 The Berg rule has been ex-
tended to some commercial transactions 516 and some other contract pro-
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 386.
514. The Washington Supreme Court has recognized that the "negotiation" requirement "over-
laps with [an] evaluation of the manner in which the parties entered into the contract and whether the
parties had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract. See, e.g., Puget Sound
Fin. v. Unisearch, 47 Wash. 2d 428, 442, 47 P.3d 940, 947 (2002).
515. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-316(4)(2006), governing warranty disclaimers provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and the provi-
sions of RCW 62A.2-719, as now or hereafter amended, in any case where goods are
purchased primarily for personal family or household use and not for commercial or
business use, disclaimers of the warranty of merchantability or fitness for particular pur-
pose shall not be effective to limit the liability of merchant sellers except insofar as the
disclaimer sets forth with particularity the qualities and characteristics which are not be-
ing warranted.
Id.
516. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20, 24 (1975) (but
the court shifted the presumption from the party seeking to validate the disclaimer to the party seek-
ing to invalidate the liability limitation by presuming that the limitation was prima facie conscion-
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visions in subsequent cases. For example, Washington law also requires
that any exclusion of remedies be explicitly negotiated and set forth with
particularity.
517
Like the Washington Supreme Court, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that under North Dakota law, an exclusion of implied warran-
ties is only effective if the exclusion was explicitly negotiated by the par-
ties.518 Colorado has also required negotiation of disclaimers in con-
519sumer transactions. Similarly, Louisiana courts have required that a
warranty disclaimer be clear and unambiguous and called to the buyer's
attention or explained to him.
520
Each of the above-described requirements is best understood not in
terms of negotiations, but as a definition of knowing assent. The purpose
of a requirement that parties negotiate over particular contract provisions
(or that the provisions be called to the buyer's attention or explained to
him or her, as in Louisiana) can only be seen as a judicial effort to carve
out a mechanism for assuring not only that the parties consent to be
bound to a contract but also that they assent to individual contract terms.
In other words, the negotiation requirement is designed to ensure that the
adhering party knows that the contract contains the particular term. If an
adhering party signs a form contract containing a disclaimer after steps
are taken to assure his awareness and understanding of the term, it could
be said that at that point there has been knowing assent.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR KNOWING ASSENT AS THE BASIS
FOR ANALYZING STANDARD FORM CONTRACT TERMS
Standard form contracts are here to stay. But adherence to outdated
doctrine and legal fictions is unnecessary. Notwithstanding repeated
able in a commercial transaction). In Schroeder, the Court adopted a "totality of circumstances"
approach for interpreting the permissibility of exclusionary clauses in a commercial setting instead
of the two-prong approach the Berg court applied to warranty disclaimers in a consumer transaction.
The nonexclusive factors for assessing the totality of the circumstances include (1) the conspicuous-
ness of the clause in the agreement, (2) the presence or absence of negotiation regarding the clause,
(3) the custom and usage of the trade, and (4) any policy developed between the parties during the
course of dealing. Id. at 260-61, 544 P. 2d at 23-24.
517. Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971). Washington, however,
has not extended the Berg rule to every disclaimer situation. For example, in Frickel v. Sunnyside
Enters, the Court held that explicit negotiation is not required for an effective disclaimer in a com-
mercial contract for the sale of an apartment complex. 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422 (1986).
518. Husky Spray Serv., Inc. v. Patzer, 471 N.W.2d 146 (S.D. 1991).
519. Hiigel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975).
520. Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., Inc., 281 So.2d 112 (La. 1972) (holding that a waiver of
implied warranties, to be effective, must be contained in the written document, be clear and unambi-
guous, and be brought to the purchaser's attention or explained to him).
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cries for the need for predictability and for controlling legal risk from
industry representatives and apologist scholars, the vast majority of con-
tracts are performed. 2 1 Most contracts will continue to be performed
regardless of the analytic approach taken to enforcing particular standard
form contract terms. If particularly troublesome contract terms are iden-
tified and omitted from standard form contracts, predictability will not be
a problem.522 In fact, a recent article in the American Bar Association
Journal suggests that because there has been so much litigation over arbi-
tration clauses, many in-house counsel do not even try to enforce arbitra-
tion provisions contained in their own standard form contracts.523
It is not unduly burdensome for form drafters to anticipate a know-
ing assent requirement and make appropriate adjustments in their stan-
dard form contracting procedures. As W. David Slawson explained in
1971:
[T]he new meaning of contract does not prevent a form-user from
defining the legal implications in its forms if it does so in an honest
and reasonable way. The forms can be drafted so that the other par-
ties can reasonably understand their terms, or a business can draft
its forms in conformity with the reasonable expectations that the
other parties will already have. To the extent a form-user does not
do either of these things, it is evidently trying to cheat, and it does
not deserve the certainty that its forms could otherwise provide.
524
For example, if arbitration is extremely important to the form
drafter, let the drafter call the adhering party's attention to the presence
of an arbitration clause and explain its meaning. A bold-faced, extra-
large print, statement written in plain English that says "NOTICE: IF
YOU SIGN THIS CONTRACT AND YOU LATER HAVE A
DISPUTE YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SUE IN COURT" and
requires the adhering party to sign an acknowledgement could solve the
problems raised by a hidden arbitration clause. It may not be possible to
protect every ignorant or uncaring party from an unwelcome result-a
521. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyers, 12 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 496 (2007) (citing results of survey indicating that on average, both lawyer-
respondents and client-respondents said that only about two percent of contracts actually end up in
litigation).
522. As the New Jersey Law Revision Commission study indicated, it is possible to identify
the particular types of contract clauses that are consistently challenged. Form drafters can either
modify their forms to delete these provisions, or choose not to enforce them if and when they are
challenged. See supra note 334.
523. Leslie A. Gordon, Clause for Alarm: As Arbitration Costs Rise, In-House Counsel Turn to
Mediation or a Combined Approach, 91 A.B.A.J. 19 (Nov. 2006).
524. Slawson, supra note 141, at 28.
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duty to read would remain a part of the doctrine-but at least people who
care would have an opportunity to learn of the presence of particular
terms in their contracts.
Ideally, legislation reflecting a public policy that addresses the
power imbalance between form drafters and adhering parties-as the
New Jersey legislation attempted to do525-would be a solution to the
problem. Unfortunately, the age of consumer protection legislation
seems to have passed us by. The New Jersey legislature's failure to en-
act the Standard Form Contract Act, and the opposition to incorporating
special standard form contract provisions in revised Article 2 demon-
strate that we cannot rely on legislatures to address the situation.
The courts remain the last clear chance for bringing a balance back
to understanding standard form contract terms. Courts can find support
for closer scrutiny of non-negotiated terms in standard form contracts in
some of the scholarly articles discussed in this article and in public pol-
icy. Like courts in Washington, North Dakota, Colorado, and Louisiana,
other courts should determine that certain contract clauses are presump-
tively invalid and require the form drafter to prove that the adhering
party knowingly consented to the term at issue before the court enforces
the term. The proposed knowing assent analysis will protect adhering
parties from unbargained-for and unfair contract terms.
525. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (discussing the New Jersey Standard Form
Contract Act).
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